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FACT SHEET RESEARCH ON BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY
H.R.N. VAN ERP, R.O. LINGER, AND P.H.A.J.M. VAN GELDER
Abstract. In this fact sheet we give some preliminary research results on the
Bayesian Decision Theory. This theory has been under construction for the
past two years. But what started as an intuitive enough idea, now seems to
have the makings of something more fundamental.
1. Introduction
It has been shown that the product and sum rules of both the Bayesian probability
and the Bayesian information theories are derivable by way of consistency, [8, 30,
14, 41, 58]; the implication being that in our plausibility and relevancy judgments
we humans have a preference for consistency, or, equivalently, rationality. Moreover,
Knuth, a MaxEnt-Bayesian1, is now researching if the very laws of physics may be
derived by way of consistency constraints on lattices of events, [43].
In light of these exciting new developments, in both the fields of inference and
physics, where consistency arguments are taking the stage by storm, and the fact
that these authors, after two years of continuous research, have reached the point
that they have come to trust their Bayesian decision theory to almost the same extent
as they have grown to trust the Bayesian probability and information theories2,
these authors have come to entertain the notion that maybe their Bayesian decision
theory, which initially started as an intuitive enough Bayesian alternative for the
paradigm of behavioral economics, might actually be Bayesian in the strictest sense
of the word; that is, an inescapable consequence of the desideratum of consistency.
In this fact sheet we will present the case, as it currently stands, for the Bayesian
decision theory, and which led us to this conjecture, together with the consistency
proof of the Bernoulli utility function, also known as the Weber-Fechner law of sense
perception.
2. The Bayesian Decision Theory
The Bayesian decision theory is very simple in structure. Its algorithmic steps
are the following:
1MaxEnt-Bayesians are, as a rule, physicists that trace their statistical lineage from Jaynes, back
to Jeffreys, back to Laplace.
2The former being their field of expertise, and the latter being the subject matter of the first
author’s current thesis work.
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(1) Use the product and sum rules of Bayesian probability theory to construct
outcome probability distributions.
(2) If our outcomes are monetary in nature, then by way of the Bernoulli utility
function we may map utilities3 to the monetary outcomes of our outcome
probability distributions.
(3) Maximize the sum of the lower and upper bounds of the resulting utility
probability distributions.
This, then, is the whole of the Bayesian decision theory.
3. Constructing Outcome Probability Distributions
In the Bayesian decision theory each problem of choice is understood to consist
of a set of decisions from which we must choose. Each possible decision, when
taken, has its own set of possible outcomes, and each outcome, for a given decision,
has its own plausibility of occurring relative to the other outcomes under that
same decision. So, each decision in our problem of choice admits its own outcome
probability distribution.
We will demonstrate in this section how to construct outcome probability distri-
butions using the rules of Bayesian probability theory4. In our hypothetical problem
of choice, the possible decisions Di, for i = 1, 2, under consideration are whether or
not to wear seat belts:
D1 = Seat belts, D2 = No Seat belts.
The relevant events Ej , for j = 1, 2, 3, when driving a car, as perceived by the
decision maker, are
E1 = No Accident, E2 = Small Accident, E3 = Severe Accident.
The perceived outcomes Ok, for k = 1, 2, 3, are
O1 = No Harm, O2 = Some Bruises, O3 = Broken Bones.
For this particular case, the decisions taken do not modulate the probabilities of
an event. So, we have that the probability for an event conditional on the decision
taken is the same for both decisions, say:
P (E1|Di) = 0.950, P (E2|Di) = 0.049, P (E3|Di) = 0.001, (3.1)
3Or, as Bernoulli called them, moral values, [6].
4See also Appendix A.
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for i = 1, 2. However, the conditional probability distributions of the outcomes
given an event are modulated by the decision taken.
We first consider the case where the decision maker is considering to wear seat
belts, that is, D1. Say, we have the following conditional probabilities:
P (O1|E1, D1) = 1.00, P (O2|E1, D1) = 0.00, P (O3|E1, D1) = 0.00,
P (O1|E2, D1) = 0.75, P (O2|E2, D1) = 0.25, P (O3|E2, D1) = 0.00,
P (O1|E3, D1) = 0.20, P (O2|E3, D1) = 0.70, P (O3|E3, D1) = 0.10.
(3.2)
Then by way of the product rule, [30],
P (A)P (B|A) = P (AB) = P (B)P (A|B) , (3.3)
we may combine the probability of an event, (3.1), with the corresponding conditional
probability distributions of some outcome given that event, (3.2), and obtain the
probabilities of an event Ej and an outcome Ok given decision Di:
P (Ej , Ok|Di) = P (Ej |Di)P (Ok|Ej , Di) . (3.4)
We may present all these probabilities (3.4) in a table and so get the corresponding
bivariate probability distribution, Table 1.
P (Ej , Ok|D1) O1 = No Harm O2 = Some Bruises O3 = Broken Bones
E1 = No Accident: 0.9500 0.0 0.0
E2 = Small Accident: 0.0370 0.0120 0.0
E3 = Severe Accident: 0.0002 0.0007 0.0001
Table 1. Bivariate event-outcome probability distribution for D1
Let Ai = {A1, . . . , An} be a set of n mutually exclusive and exhaustive proposi-
tions, that is, one and only one of the Ai is necessarily true. Let Bj = {B1, . . . , Bm}
be another set of m mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. Then, by way
of the generalized sum rule, [30], we have
n∑
i=1
P (Ai, Bj) = P (A1, Bj) + · · ·+ P (An, Bj) = P (Bj) , (3.5)
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where
∑
j P (Bj) = 1. Using this generalized sum rule, we may ‘marginalize’ the
event-outcome probabilities P (Ej , Ok|D1) over the events Ej , that is,
P (Ok|Di) =
m∑
j=1
P (Ej , Ok|Di) , (3.6)
and so get the marginalized outcome probability distribution, Table 2.
O1 = No Harm O2 = Some Bruises O3 = Broken Bones
P (Ok|D1) 0.9872 0.0127 0.0001
Table 2. Marginalized outcome probability distribution for D1
We now consider the case we the decision maker is considering not to wear seat
belts, that is, D2. Say we have the following conditional probabilities:
P (O1|E1, D2) = 1.00, P (O2|E1, D2) = 0.00, P (O3|E1, D2) = 0.00,
P (O1|E2, D2) = 0.25, P (O2|E2, D2) = 0.75, P (O3|E2, D2) = 0.00,
P (O1|E3, D2) = 0.10, P (O2|E3, D2) = 0.30, P (O3|E3, D2) = 0.60.
(3.7)
Then, using (3.3), we may combine the probability of an event, (3.1), with the
corresponding conditional probability distributions of some outcome given that
event, (3.7), and so get the corresponding bivariate probability distribution, Table 3.
P (Ej , Ok|D2) O1 = No Harm O2 = Some Bruises O3 = Broken Bones
E1 = No Accident: 0.9500 0.0 0.0
E2 = Small Accident: 0.0120 0.0370 0.0
E3 = Severe Accident: 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006
Table 3. Bivariate event-outcome probability distribution for D2
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Marginalizing the event-outcome probabilities P (Ej , Ok|D2) over the events Ej ,
(3.5), we get the marginalized outcome probability distribution, Table 4.
O1 = No Harm O2 = Some Bruises O3 = Broken Bones
P (Ok|D1) 0.9621 0.0373 0.0006
Table 4. Marginalized outcome probability distribution for D2
In its most abstract form, we have that each problem of choice consists of a set
of potential decisions
Di = {D1, . . . , Dn} .
Each decision Di we make may give rise to a set of possible events
Eji = {E1i , . . . , Emi} .
These events Eji are associated with the decisions Di by way of the conditional
probabilities P (Eji |Di). Furthermore, each event Eji allows for a set of potential
outcomes
Okji =
{
O1ji , . . . , Olji
}
.
These outcomes Okji are associated with the events Eji by way of the conditional
probabilities P
(
Okji
∣∣Eji).
By way of the product rule, (3.3), we compute the bivariate probability distribu-
tion of an event and an outcome conditional on the decision taken:
P
(
Eji , Okji
∣∣Di) = P (Eji |Di)P (Okji ∣∣Eji) . (3.8)
The outcome probability distribution is then obtained by marginalizing, (3.5), over
all the possible events
P
(
Okji
∣∣Di) = mi∑
ji=1
P
(
Eji , Okji
∣∣Di) . (3.9)
The outcome probability distributions (3.9), for i = 1, . . . , n, are the information
carriers which represent our state of knowledge in regards to the consequences of
our decisions.
At first sight the added event space in the abstract form given here may seem
somewhat superfluous5. But it was felt that further down the line, in decision
5As this event space hardly is used in this fact sheet.
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theoretical problems more complex than the ones given in this fact sheet, this added
space may help one in the construction of outcome probability distributions6.
4. Translating Monetary Outcomes to Utilities
The Bernoulli utility function in the field of psycho-physics7 is called Weber-
Fechner law. Seeing that we will use in this section the psycho-physical point of view
of money increments as a stimulus, we will refer in what follows to the Bernoulli
utility function as the Weber-Fechner law. But both names point to the same
function8.
The translation of monetary stimuli to utilities is analogous to the case where we
are asked to translate loudness to a numerical value. According to Weber-Fechner
law, postulated in the 19th century9 by the experimental psychologist Fechner,
intuitive human sensations tend to be logarithmic functions of the difference in
stimulus, [16]. So, we do not perceive stimuli in isolation, rather we perceive the
relative change in stimuli, case in point being the decibel scale of sound.
Let S1 and S2 be two stimuli which are to be compared. Then the Weber-Fechner
law tells us that the Relative Change (RC) is the difference of the logarithms of the
stimuli:
RC = c logd S2 − c logd S1 = c logd
S2
S1
, (4.1)
where c is some scaling factor and d some base of the logarithm. From (4.1), we
have that if stimuli S1 and S2 are indistinguishable, that is, of the same strength,
then their RC is 0. If S2 increases relative to S1, then RC > 0. If S2 decreases
relative to S1, then RC < 0.
The Weber-Fechner law allows for one degree of freedom. This can be seen as
follows. Since
logd x =
log x
log d
,
we can rewrite (4.1) as
RC = q log
S2
S1
, (4.2)
6If we want to collect all the possible outcomes in one probability distribution, under a given
decision, then we may first gather the different events, which precede these outcomes, in a seperate
probability distribution. We foresee that this factoring may greatly help in the construction of
complex outcome probability distributions; cascading events, event trees, etc...
7Psycho-physics is the experimental field of psychology that studies sense perception.
8In the next section we will formally derive the Bernoulli utility function by way of a novel
consistency argument. In Appendices B and C we, respectively, discuss the ubiquitousness of the
Bernoulli utility function, which has been derived several times over by different arguments, and
proceed to give its corollary, the negative Bernoulli utility function, which may be used to model
the utility of debt.
9Which is just Bernoulli’s utility function, postulated in the 18th century; see Appendix B.
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where
q =
c
log d
. (4.3)
Let ∆S be an increment, either positive or negative, in a monetary stimulus S.
Then we may define the utility of a monetary increment ∆S to be the perceived
relative change in the initial wealth S due to that increment ∆S, (4.2):
u(∆S|S) = q log S + ∆S
S
, −S < ∆S <∞. (4.4)
If ∆S = −S, then (4.4) tells us that a loss of all one’s initial wealth S would
have a utility of minus infinity. This is clearly not realistic. So, in order to model
such a loss, we must introduce the threshold of income which is still significant γ,
[30], where γ > 0. The threshold of income has the following interpretation.
Even for the homeless person there is some minimum amount of money that is
still significant. This may be one dollar for a bag of potato chips, or three dollars for
a packet of cigarettes. If the loss of money breaks through the limit of the minimum
significant amount γ, the homeless person is left with an amount of money which,
for all intents and purposes, is worthless. Using the concept of the threshold of
income, we may modify (4.4) as
u(∆S|S) = q log S + ∆S
S
, −S + γ < ∆S <∞. (4.5)
If we want to give a graphical representation of (4.5), then the scaling constant
q, also known as the Weber constant, must be set to some numerical value.
Say, we have a monthly expendable income of a thousand dollars, for groceries
and the like, then introspection10 would suggest that a loss or gain of an amount
less than ten dollars would not move us that much.
So, ∆S = 10 constitutes a just noticeable difference, or, equivalently, 1 utile, for
an initial wealth of S = 1000, (4.5):
1 utile = q log
1000 + 10
1000
. (4.6)
If we then solve for the unknown Weber constant q, we find
q =
1
log 1010− log 1000 ≈ 100. (4.7)
Note that utiles represent the utility of the monetary outcomes, much like decibels
represent the perceived intensity of sound11.
Suppose we have a student who has three hundred dollars per month to spend on
groceries and the like and who stands to lose or to gain up to two hundred dollars.
10Introspection being the starting point of all psychological experimentation.
11Note that for the decibel scale the Weber constant has been determined to be q = 10/ log 10 =
4.34.
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Then, by way of (4.5) and (4.7), we obtain the following mapping of monetary
outcomes to utilities, Figure 1.
Figure 1. Utility plot for initial wealth 300 dollars
For the case of the rich man who has one million dollars to spend on groceries and
the like and who stands stands to lose or to gain up to a hundred thousand dollars,
we obtain the alternative mapping, Figure 2.
Figure 2. Utility plot for initial wealth 1.000.000 dollars
Loss aversion is the phenomenon that losses may loom larger than gains, [63].
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we see that the Weber-Fechner law of experimental
psychology, which is just Bernoulli’s utility function, captures both the loss aversion
of the poor student, that is, asymmetry in gains and losses, as well as the linearity
of the utility of relatively small gains and losses for the rich man.
5. A Consistency Proof of the Bernoulli Utility Function
We will derive the Bernoulli utility function, or, equivalently, the Weber-Fechner
law, using the desiderata of invariance and consistency. In this we follow a venerable
Bayesian tradition, [8, 30, 41].
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5.1. Setting up the functional equations. Say, we have the positive quantities
x, y, z, t of some stimulus or commodity of interest. These quantities, being numbers
on the positive real and, consequently, transitive, admit an ordering. The quantities
are assumed to be ordered as x ≤ y ≤ z ≤ t. We now want to find the function f
that quantifies the perceived decrease associated with going from, say, the quantity
y to the quantity x.
The first functional equation is based on the observation that the unknown
function f should be invariant for a change in the unit of the quantity, that is,
f(cx, cy) = f(x, y) , (5.1)
where c is some scaling factor.
For, example, if our quantities concern sums of money, then a perceived loss
should be invariant for a change in the monetary unit. The perceived loss of going
from ten dollars to one dollar should be the same perceived loss if we reformulate
this scenario in dollar cents, that is, if we go from a thousand dollar cents to a
hundred dollar cents.
Note that we also may interpret (5.1) in the following way. If person A has
an initial wealth of y and person B has a wealth of cy, where c is some positive
constant, then the perceived loss of person A when going from y to x should be the
same as the perceived loss of person B when going from cy to cx. This alternative
interpretation of (5.1) connects with Bernoulli’s original derivation of the utility
function, in that it is a corollary of the reasoning that led him to his third and final
consideration12.
In order to give the second functional equation, we must introduce the function
g that enforces a change of context, [41]:
f(x, z) = g[f(x, y) , f(y, z)] . (5.2)
The functional equation (5.2) is a consistency equation that states that the perceived
decrease in going from z to x, should be the same perceived decrease if we first go
from z to y, and then from y to x.
If we assume differentiability, then the invariance equations (5.1) and (5.2),
together with the two boundary conditions:
f(x, x) = 0, (5.3)
and
f(x, y) < 0, for x < y, (5.4)
are sufficient to find the function f that quantifies the perceived decrease associated
with going from the quantity y to the quantity x.
12See Appendix B.
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5.2. Solving the functional equations. We first will look at the structure that
the invariance equation (5.1) provides us in determining the form of f . To do so,
we take for (5.1) the derivative over c:
d
dc
f(cx, cy) =
d
dc
f(x, y) (5.5)
which leaves with the partial differential equation
xf (1,0)(cx, cy) + yf (0,1)(cx, cy) = 0 (5.6)
or, equivalently, if we let u = cx and v = cy,
u
c
f (1,0)(u, v) +
v
c
f (0,1)(u, v) = 0. (5.7)
This partial differential equation has as its general solution:
f(u, v) = h
(u
v
)
, (5.8)
were h is some arbitrary function.
The consistency equation (5.2) may be solved as follows. First, by way of (5.2),
we construct the associativity equation, [1, 41]:
g{g[f(x, y) , f(y, z)] , f(z, t)} = f(x, t) = g{f(x, y) , g[f(y, z) , f(z, t)]} . (5.9)
The solution of this associativity equation, which is relatively well-known, is given
as, [1, 41]:
Θ[f(x, z)] = Θ[f(x, y)] + Θ[f(y, z)] , (5.10)
where Θ(x) is some monotonic function.
If we substitute (5.8) into (5.10), we get:
Θ
[
h
(x
z
)]
= Θ
[
h
(
x
y
)]
+ Θ
[
h
(y
z
)]
. (5.11)
Letting m(x) = Θ[h(x)], we may rewrite (5.11) as:
m
(x
z
)
= m
(
x
y
)
+m
(y
z
)
. (5.12)
Taking the derivative over y (5.12), that is,
d
dy
m
(x
z
)
=
d
dy
[
m
(
x
y
)
+m
(y
z
)]
, (5.13)
we obtain the ordinary differential equation:
0 = − x
y2
m′
(
x
y
)
+
1
z
m′
(y
z
)
, (5.14)
or, equivalently,
x
y
m′
(
x
y
)
=
y
z
m′
(y
z
)
. (5.15)
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If we let u = y/z and c = x/z, then we may rewrite (5.15) as
c
u
m′
( c
u
)
= um′(u) . (5.16)
If we take the derivative of c over (5.16), that is,
d
dc
c
u
m′
( c
u
)
=
d
dc
um′(u) , (5.17)
then we obtain the ordinary differential equation:
1
u
m′
( c
u
)
+
c
u2
m′′
( c
u
)
= 0. (5.18)
If we let v = c/u, then we may rewrite (5.18) as
m′(v) + vm′′(v) = 0. (5.19)
The general solution of m is given as:
m(v) = q log v + C. (5.20)
where q and C are arbitrary constants.
It then follows from (5.8) and (5.20) that the function f , which adheres to
the invariance desideratum (5.1) and the consistency desideratum (5.2), has as its
general solution:
f(x, y) = q log
x
y
+ C. (5.21)
where q and C are arbitrary constants.
From the boundary conditions (5.3) and (5.4), it then follows, respectively, that
C = 0 and that q ≥ 0, which leaves us with the specific solution:
f(x, y) = q log
x
y
, for q ≥ 0, (5.22)
which is the Bernoulli utility function, originally proposed by Bernoulli in 1738, [6].
It follows that the Bernoulli utility function is the only function that adheres to
the desiderata of unit invariance and consistency, respectively, (5.1) and (5.2), and
the boundary conditions that a zero change should lead to a zero perceived loss
and that a perceived loss should be assigned a negative value, respectively, (5.3)
and (5.4). Any other utility function will be in violation with these fundamental
desiderata and boundary conditions.
The amazing thing here, at least to these authors’ mind, is that so much was
gained for so little. As one need not mention monetary gains and losses or changes
in offered sensory stimuli in order to derive the Bernoulli utility function, or,
equivalently, the Weber-Fechner law.
We offer here the following observation, the functional equation (5.1) is, in its
alternative interpretation, an invariance argument for two persons holding different
amounts of initial wealth. Bernoulli, instead, uses variance arguments to arrive at
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his derivation. But both the variance and invariance arguments, as in the variance
argument the wealth of person A approaches the wealth of person B13.
6. The Criterion Of Choice
In this section we will discuss the maximization of the sum of the lower and
upper bounds, the third step in the Bayesian decision algorithm, as a criterion of
choice. This criterion is highly non-intuitive, as it admits no interpretation. This
is because it is a ‘corollary’, or, to be more precise, an algebraic reshuffling, of a
criterion which is intuitive, but less succinct in its expression.
Let D1 and D2 be two decisions we have to choose from. Let Oi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
and Oj , for j = 1, . . . ,m, be the monetary outcomes associated with, respectively,
decisions D1 and D2.
In the Bayesian decision analysis, we first construct the two outcome distributions
that correspond with these decisions:
P (Oi|D1) , P (Oj |D2) , (6.1)
where, if n = m, the outcomes Oi and Oj may or not may be equal for i = j.
We then proceed, by way of the Bernoulli utility function, or, equivalently, the
Weber-Fechner law, to map utilities to the monetary outcomes Oi and Oj in (6.1).
This leaves us with the utility probability distributions:
P (ui|D1) , P (uj |D2) . (6.2)
Our most primitive intuition regarding the utility probability distributions (6.2)
is that the decision which corresponds with the utility probability distribution
which lies more to the right will also be the decision that promises to be the most
advantageous. So, when making a decision we compare the positions of the utility
probability distribution on the utility axis. This utility axis goes from minus infinity
to plus infinity. Hence, the more-to-the-right criterion of choice.
Now, the confidence bounds of (6.2), say:
[LB(ui|D1) , UB(ui|D1)] , [LB(uj |D2) , UB(uj |D2)] , (6.3)
may provide us with a numerical handle on the concept of more-to-the-right.
For example, if we have that both
LB(ui|D1) > LB(uj |D2) , UB(ui|D1) > UB(uj |D2) . (6.4)
Then we will have an unambiguous preference for decision D1 over decision D2;
seeing that under both the still probable worst and best case we will be better if we
opt for D1.
13See Appendix B.
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Likewise, if we have that either
LB(ui|D1) = LB(uj |D2) , UB(ui|D1) > UB(uj |D2) , (6.5)
or
LB(ui|D1) > LB(uj |D2) , UB(ui|D1) = UB(uj |D2) . (6.6)
Then, again, we will have an unambiguous preference for decision D1 over decision
D2. In the constellation (6.5), we stand, all other things being equal, to be better
of under the still probable best case scenario; while in the constellation (6.6), we
stand, all other things being equal, to be less worse of under the still probable worst
case scenario.
However, things become more ambiguous when, say, under decision D1, we have
to make a trade-off between either a gain in the upper bound and a loss in the lower
bound
LB(ui|D1) < LB(uj |D2) , UB(ui|D1) > UB(uj |D2) , (6.7)
or a gain in the lower bound and a loss in the upper bound
LB(ui|D1) > LB(uj |D2) , UB(ui|D1) < UB(uj |D2) . (6.8)
We postulate here that a rational criterion of choice in the respective trade-off
situations (6.7) and (6.8), would be to pick that decision whose gain in either the
lower or upper bound exceeds the loss in the corresponding upper or lower bound.
So, if, say, under D1 we stand to gain more in the still probable best case scenario
than we stand to lose under the still probable worst case scenario, that is, (6.7):
LB(uj |D2)− LB(ui|D1) < UB(ui|D1)− UB(uj |D2) , (6.9)
then we will choose D1 over D2. Likewise, if under D1 we stand to gain more in
the still probable worst case scenario than we stand to lose under the still probable
best case scenario, that is, (6.8):
LB(ui|D1)− LB(uj |D2) > UB(uj |D2)− UB(ui|D1) , (6.10)
then again we will choose D1 over D2.
Note that the gains and losses in this discussion pertain to gains and losses on
the utility dimension, not on the monetary outcome dimension. On the utility
dimension the phenomenon of loss aversion, that is, the phenomenon that monetary
losses may weigh heavier than equal monetary qains, has already been accounted
for. Stated differently, the utility scale is a linear loss-aversion corrected scale for
the moral value of monies.
Now, if we look at the scenarios (6.7) and (6.8), and the corresponding postulated
rational, because intuitive, criteria of choice (6.9) and (6.10), then we see that we
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will choose D1 over D2 whenever we have that
LB(ui|D1) + UB(ui|D1) > LB(uj |D2) + UB(uj |D2) . (6.11)
Moreover, this single criterion of choice is also consistent with the choosing of D1
over D2 in the scenarios (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6).
This, then, is the rationale behind the non-intuitive, because it admits no
interpretation, criterion of choice that we should maximize the sum of the lower
and upper bounds of the utility probability distributions, in order to come to the
optimal decision14.
Note that if the decision inequality (6.11) goes to an equality:
LB(ui|D1) + UB(ui|D1) = LB(uj |D2) + UB(uj |D2) . (6.12)
Then we have that we will be undecided when it comes to the decisions D1 and D2.
Also note that for k-sigma bounds (6.3) translates to
E(ui|D1)± k std(ui|D1) , E(uj |D2)± k std(uj |D2) , (6.13)
which, if substituted in (6.11), gives the inequality
2E(ui|D1) > 2E(uj |D2) , (6.14)
which brings us right back to Bernoulli’s expected utility theory, as proposed in
1738, [6], in which it is stated that the expectation value of the utility probability
distribution should be maximized.
Nonetheless, the criterion of choice, that the sum of the upper and lower bound
should be maximized, as proposed here, will deviate from Bernoulli’s initial 1738
proposal when the k-sigma intervals overshoots either its minimal or maximal value
of the utility probability distribution.
Let a and b, respectively, be the minimal and maximal values of a given utility
probability distribution. Then we may identify two additional symmetry breaking
14Instead of the criterion (6.11), one may also use a lower bound maximization, that is, choose D1
whenever
LB(ui|D1) > LB(uj |D2) ,
A possible lower bound maximizer might be the regulator who is not that interested in a bank’s
potential profit, but only has an eye for the potential catastrophic losses that, were they to
materialize, could destabilize the entire financial system. Or,alternatively, one may use an upper
bound maximization, that is, choose D1 whenever
UB(ui|D1) > UB(uj |D2) ,
where the upper bound maximizer is the banker that tries to maximize his yearly bonus.
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cases, relative to (6.14):
LB(u) + UB(u) =

2 E(u) , LB(u) > a, UB(u) < b
a+ UB(u) , LB(u) < a, UB(u) < b
LB(u) + b, LB(u) > a, UB(u) > b
(6.15)
These two last symmetry breaking cases, where the k-sigma intervals overshoot the
minimal and maximal values of a given utility probability distribution are non-trivial,
as they give rise to the specific S-shape of the fair probabilities in certainty bets15.
Another instance where we will deviate from Bernoulli’s proposal is when we put
an explicit premium on either caution or opportunity. If we take as the lower and
upper bounds, whose sum is to be maximized:
LB(u) = E(u)− a std(u) , (6.16)
and
UB(u) = E(u) + b std(u) . (6.17)
Then (6.16) and (6.17) sum to:
LB(u) + UB(u) = 2 E(u) + (b− a) std(u) . (6.18)
If in (6.18) we let a > b, then we put a premium caution; if we set b > a, then we
put a premium on opportunity; and if we let a = b, then we have an equal trade-off
between caution and opportunity taking.
7. The Ellsberg Paradox
In this section we will demonstrate how to construct a non-trivial outcome
distribution, by way of the product and sum rules, and how to map outcomes to
their corresponding utilities by way of the product and sum rules.
Ellsberg found that the willingness to bet on an uncertain event depends not only
on the degree of uncertainty but also on its source, [11]. He observed that people
prefer to bet on an urn containing equal numbers of red and green balls, rather
than on an urn that contains red and green balls in unknown proportions. Ellsberg
called this observed phenomenon source dependence.
Tversky and Kahneman [63], state that source dependence constitutes one of the
minimal challenges that must be met by any adequate descriptive theory of choice.
As our theory of choice is Bayesian, we will proceed to give a Bayesian treatment of
this phenomenon16.
15Certainty bets will be discussed in the section following the next one.
16Note that we do not claim that decision makers will derive the Bayesian equations which will
follow ad verbatim. Rather, we state that Bayesian inference is common sense amplified, having a
much higher probability resolution than our human brains can ever hope to achieve. So, being
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7.1. Constructing outcome probability distributions. Say, we have a large
urn consisting of 1000 balls of which 500 are red and 500 green. We tell our subject
that of the N = 1000 balls R = 500 are red and N −R = 500 green, and that he is
to draw a ball n = 100 times. After each draw he will get a dollar if the ball is red
and nothing if the ball is green, after which the ball is to be put back in the urn.
The subject is also told that for the privilege to partake in this bet an entrance fee
of 50 dollars is to be paid.
The probability of drawing r red balls in the first bet D1 may be modeled by
way of a binomial distribution:
p(r|n,R,N,D1) = n!
r! (n− r)!
(
R
N
)r (
1− R
N
)n−r
. (7.1)
Now as the net return, say, o is in dollars, having as its value number of red balls
minus entrance fee, we have
o = r − 50, (7.2)
where, as there are n = 100 draws, −50 ≤ o ≤ 50. We then make a simple change
of variable, using (7.2),
r = o+ 50 (7.3)
and substitute (7.3) into (7.1), so as to get the probability function of the net return
p(o|n,R,N,D1) = n!
(o+ 50)! (n− o− 50)!
(
R
N
)o+50(
1− R
N
)n−o−50
(7.4)
The probability distribution of the net return for bet D1, that is,
p(o|n = 100, R = 500, N = 1000, D1) ,
then can be plotted as, Figure 3:
Figure 3. Probability outcome distribution for bet 1
common sense amplified, the results of the Bayesian analysis should be commensurate with our
intuitions; rather than the analysis itself. See also Appendix D.
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This probability distribution has a mean and a standard deviation of, respectively,
E(o|D1) = 0, std(o|D1) = 5. (7.5)
For the second bet, we tell our subject that the urn holds N = 1000 balls which
are either red or green. Again, for every red ball drawn there will be a dollar payout.
There will be n = 100 draws and after each draw the ball is to be placed in the
urn again. The entrance fee of the bet is 50 dollars. However, we are also told that
the number of red balls is neither zero nor thousand17, that is, 0 < R < N , thus,
precluding the certainty outcomes of o = −50 and o = 50 for, respectively, R = 0
and R = 1000.
As the subject does not know the actual number of red balls R, the Bayesian
thing to do is to weigh the probability of drawing r red balls over all plausible values
of R, the total number red balls in the urn.
Based on the background information, we assign an uniform prior probability
distribution to R, the unknown number of red balls in the urn:
p(R) =
1
N − 1 , (7.6)
where R = 1, . . . , N − 1. So, by way of the product and the generalized sum rules,
(3.3) and (3.5), the probability of drawing r red balls in the second bet D2 translates
to
p(r|n,N,D2) =
N−1∑
R=1
p(r,R|n,N,D2) =
N−1∑
R=1
p(R) p(r|n,R,N,D2) . (7.7)
Again making a change of variable from the number of red balls drawn r to the net
return o, we substitute (7.1) and (7.6) into (7.7) and make a change of variable by
way of (7.3). This results in the probability distribution of the net return o:
p(o|n,N,D2) =
N−1∑
R=1
1
N − 1
n!
(o+ 50)! (n− o− 50)!
(
R
N
)o+50(
1− R
N
)n−o−50
.
(7.8)
The probability distribution of the net return for bet D2, that is,,
p(o|n = 100, N = 1000, D2) ,
then can be plotted as, Figure 4:
17We could let the range of the red balls be 0 ≤ R ≤ N . But then the resulting outcome probability
distribution would become unwieldy, because of this added structure.
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Figure 4. Probability outcome distribution for bet 2
This probability distribution has a mean and standard deviation of, respectively,
E(o|D2) = 0, std(o|D2) = 29. (7.9)
In Figure 5, we give both probability distributions, Figures 6.1 and 6.2, together.
Figure 5. Probability outcome distributions for bets 1 and 2
7.2. Constructing utility probability distributions. Let D1 stand for the de-
cision to choose the first Ellsberg bet and D2 for the decision to choose the second
Ellsberg bet. Then, by substituting, where appropriate, the values n = 100, R = 500,
N = 1000 into (7.4) and (7.8), we may obtain the corresponding outcome probability
distributions:
p(o|n = 100, R = 500, N = 1000, D1) = 100!
(o+ 50)! (50− o)!
(
1
2
)100
,
(7.10)
p(o|n = 100, N = 1000, D2) = 100!
(o+ 50)! (50− o)!
999∑
R=1
1
999
(
R
1000
)o+50(
1− R
1000
)50−o
.
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In order to map the outcomes o in (7.10) to values on the utility dimension
u, we introduce the conditional probability distribution p(u| o). Combining (7.10)
with p(u| o), by way of the product rule (3.3), and marginalizing over the possible
outcomes o, by way of the generalized sum rule (3.5), we may get the utility
probability distribution of interest, that is,
p(u|Di) =
∑
o
p(u, o|Di) =
∑
o
p(u| o) p(o|Di) . (7.11)
Now, if we assign as our utility function the Bernoulli utility function, then the
conditional utility probability distribution to be employed in the Ellsberg example
is:
p(u| o,m, q) =
1, u = q log m+om0, u 6= q log m+om (7.12)
for o = −50,−49, . . . , 50, and where m is our initial wealth and q is the scaling
constant of the Bernoulli utility function. This probability distribution takes us
from the o-dimension, which is the dimension of the monetary outcomes, to the
u-dimension, which is the dimension of the moral value of these monetary outcomes.
From (7.12), we see that every outcome o admits only one utility value u; that is,
(7.12) is of the Dirac delta form:
p(u| o, q,m) = δ
(
u− q log m+ o
m
)
, (7.13)
where δ is the Dirac delta function for which
δ(u− c) du =
1, u = c0, u 6= c (7.14)
Because of (7.14), we have that∫
δ(u− c) f(u) du = f(c) . (7.15)
Applying both (7.11) and the Dirac delta (7.13) to the outcome distributions
(7.10), we obtain the utility probability distributions:
p(u|m, q,D1) =
50∑
o=−50
δ
(
u− q log m+ o
m
)
p(o|D1) ,
(7.16)
p(u|m, q,D2) =
50∑
o=−50
δ
(
u− q log m+ o
m
)
p(o|D2) ,
where in the probability distributions we only conditionalize on that which is not
yet specified.
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The kth-order moments of the utility probability distributions (7.16) may be
evaluated by way of the integrals:
E
(
uk
∣∣Di) = ∫ uk p(u|m, q,Di) du. (7.17)
7.3. Applying the criterion of choice. If we assume a modest intial wealth, that
is, monthly expendable income, of two-hundred dollars, that is, m = 200. Then
the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of the utility probability distributions
(7.16) are given as18
E(u| q,D1) = −0.0003 q, std(u| q,D1) = 0.025 q, (7.18)
and
E(u| q,D2) = −0.0108 q, std(u| q,D2) = 0.1479 q. (7.19)
The minimum and maximum values, respectively, a and b, of the utility probability
distributions are given as, (4.5) and problem statement:
a = q log
200− 50
200
= −0.2877q, b = q log 200− 50 + 100
200
= 0.2231q. (7.20)
In the following, we will use 1-sigma intervals. Seeing that for these confidence
intervals no overshoot occurs, we use for the sum of the lower and upper bounds of
the utility probability distributions the first identity of (6.15). This gives for (7.18):
LB(u| q,D1) + UB(u| q,D1) = 2E(u| q,D1) = −0.0006 q, (7.21)
and for (7.19):
LB(u| q,D2) + UB(u| q,D2) = 2E(u| q,D1) = −0.0216 q. (7.22)
If we compare (7.21) and (7.22), then we find that decision D1 is more advanta-
geous than decision D2:
LB(u| q,D1) + UB(u| q,D1) > LB(u| q,D2) + UB(u| q,D2) , (7.23)
since
− 0.0006 q > −0.0216 q, (7.24)
for any positive scaling constant q.
As an aside the unknown scaling constant q will always fall away in the decision
theoretical inequalities. This is because the mean and standard deviations of the
utility probability distributions are linear in q. Stated differently, it may be checked
18The first two cumulants of the utility probability distributions (7.16) may be computed by way
of (7.17) and the identities, [23]:
µ = E(u|Di) , σ =
√
E(u2|Di)− [E(u|Di)]2.
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that, for the stochastics X and Y , and a positive constant q, [45]:
E(qX) = q E(X) , std(qX) = q std(X) . (7.25)
So, unless we want to interpret our decisions in terms of net utility gain, as we do
below, then we may, without any loss of generality, set the unknown scaling constant
q to one.
Now, if we are willing to commit ourselves to the scaling constant value of q = 100
as the Weber constant for monetary stimuli, (4.7). Then we may, by way of (6.10),
interpret (7.23) as follows.
Under decision D1, betting on an urn with an equal number of red and green
balls, there is a gain of 13.34 utiles, in terms of loss mitigation, and a loss of 11.24
utiles, in terms of gain reduction, relative to decision D2, betting on an urn with
an unknown proportion of red balls. This makes D1, with a net utility gain of 2.10
utiles, more attractive a choice than D2.
The setting of the scaling constant q also allows us to plot the utility probability
distributions under D1 and D2, Figure 6.
Figure 6. Probability utility distributions for bets 1 and 2
We summarize, in a Bayesian decision theoretical analysis we first construct the
outcome probability distributions on a monetary unit scale under the decisions D1
and D2, Figure 5. We then construct, by way of the Bernoulli utility function, the
corresponding utility probability distributions on an (un)scaled utile scale, Figure 6.
We then compare, for a given decision, the gain/loss in the lower bound relative to
the corresponding loss/gain in the upper bound; or, equivalently, in the algebraic
sense of the word, we compare the sums of the upper and lower bounds under the
decisions D1 and D2.
The results of this Bayesian decision theoretical analysis is in correspondence with
the Ellsberg finding that people prefer to bet on an urn containing equal numbers
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of red and green balls, rather than on an urn that contains red and green balls in
unknown proportions, [11].
In closing, we may envisage decision problems in which we are uncertain regarding
the actual utility of a given outcome o. Such an occasion may arise when we do not
know the initial wealth m of the subject under investigation. In those cases we will
want to assign probability distributions p(u| o) less dogmatic than the Dirac delta
(7.13) to our utilities.
8. The Psychological Certainty Effect, Part I
Certainty bets admit the following structure. Let Oc and Ou, respectively, be the
certainty and the uncertainty outcomes, where Oc < Ou. The uncertainty outcome
Ou has a probability of p of being realized. In the case that Ou is not realized the
outcome will be zero, and the probability corresponding with this outcome is 1− p.
The certainty outcome Oc is certain and, hence, has a probability of one.
So, the outcome probability distributions for certainty bets are
p(Oi|D1) =
p, O1 = Ou1− p, O2 = 0 (8.1)
and
p(Oj |D2) =
{
1.0, O1 = Oc (8.2)
In what follows we will assume, initially, for simplicity’s sake, a linear utility for
monetary outcomes. This assumption corresponds with an initial wealth m that
vastly exceeds any increment ∆m. This can be seen as follows. The logarithmic
function admits the series expansion:
log (1 + x) = x− x
2
2
+
x3
3
− x
4
4
+ · · · . (8.3)
So, as m/∆m tends to zero, we have that the Bernoulli utility function, or, equiva-
lently, the Weber-Fechner law, (4.5) tends to, (8.3):
q log
m+ ∆m
m
= q log
(
1 +
∆m
m
)
→ q∆m
m
, (8.4)
as can be seen in Figure 2.
Fairness is defined as the decision theoretical equality:
LB(u| p,D1) + UB(u| p,D1) = LB(u|D2) + UB(u|D2) , (8.5)
where D1 and D2 correspond with the choosing of, respectively, the uncertainty and
certainty bets. Fairness finds its expression in the equality (8.5) because this equality
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guarantees that any loss/gain in the lower bound will be offset by a commensurate
gain/loss in the upper bound19, for both D1 and D2.
If, for a certainty bet having positive outcomes, we solve (8.5) for the fair
probability p, assuming a linear utility for money, and taking care to take into
account any symmetry breaking conditions that may occur, (6.15), we find that the
fair probability p maps to the outcome intervals
(0, 2Oc) , for Oc ≤ Ou
2
, (8.6)
which is intuitively fair for both the takers and the providers of decision D1, relative
to the certainty offer of Oc, and
(2Oc −Ou, Ou) , for Oc > Ou
2
, (8.7)
which is intuitively fair for both the takers and providers of decision D1, relative to
the certainty offer of Oc.
If for an uncertainty pay out of either 0 or Ou = 5000, we plot the solution of
(8.5) for the fairness probability p, assuming a linear utility for monetary outcomes,
as a function of the certainty outcome Oc, we obtain Figure 7:
Figure 7. Fair probability as function of certain outcome, positive outcomes
If we again solve (8.5) for the fairness probability p, as a function of the certainty
outcome Oc, assuming a linear utility for monetary outcomes, but now neglecting
any symmetry breaking conditions, and add this expected utility theory solution to
Figure 7, we obtain Figure 8:
19See Section 6.
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Figure 8. Fair probability for sum of bounds and expectation
value maximization, positive outcomes
If, for a certainty bet having negative outcomes, we solve (8.5) for the fair
probability p, assuming a linear utility for money, and taking care to take into
account any symmetry breaking conditions that may occur, (6.15), we find that the
fair probability p maps to the outcome intervals
(2Oc, 0) , for Oc ≥ Ou
2
, (8.8)
which is intuitively fair for both the takers and the providers of decision D1, relative
to the certainty offer of Oc, and
(Ou, 2Oc −Ou) , for Oc < Ou
2
, (8.9)
which is intuitively fair for both the takers and providers of decision D1, relative to
the certainty offer of Oc.
If for an uncertainty pay out of either 0 or Ou = −5000, we plot the solution of
(8.5) for the fairness probability p, assuming a linear utility for monetary outcomes,
as a function of the negative certainty outcome Oc, we obtain Figure 9:
Figure 9. Fair probability for sum of bounds and expectation
value maximization, negative outcomes
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If we rescale the x-axes of Figures 8 and 9 as the ratio Oc/Ou, where |Oc| ≤ |Ou|,
and reverse the axes, we obtain the alternative Figure 10:
Figure 10. Rescaled and rotated figure for positive and negative values
Now, those readers who are familiar with the cumulative prospect theory may
recognize in Figure 10, Kahneman and Tversky’s Figures 1, 2, and 3 of their [63].
But Kahneman and Tversky obtained their figures not from first principles, as is
done here, but through experimentation, in which subjects where asked to decide
on certainty bets of the type we discussed in the previous section. So, it would seem
that Kahneman and Tversky, inadvertently, for they are outspoken anti-Bayesian20,
have provided the Bayesian decision theory with a very strong supporting contact.
Kahneman and Tversky see in the empirical observation of the typical S-curve of
Figure 10 another justification21 for their probability weighing functions22,
w+(p) =
pγ
pγ + (1− p) 1γ
, (8.10)
and
w−(p) =
pδ
pδ + (1− p) 1δ
, (8.11)
which over weighs small probabilities and under weighs large probabilities. Moreover,
Kahneman and Tversky offer up the implied under weighing of small probabilities,
in order to explain the general popularity of lotteries and insurances.
We, on the other hand, see in the empirical observation of the typical S-curve
of Figure 10 a confirmation of the non-triviality of the proposed criterion of choice
(6.15).
If we drop the assumption of a linear utility of monetary outcomes in the
neighborhood of −5000 < ∆m < 5000, and for initial wealths of m = 1000 and
20See Appendix F.
21See Appendix G, for a discussion of the initial justification.
22Note that Kahneman and Tversky’s γ and δ are not our γ and δ.
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m = 6000 for certainty bets involving, respectively, positive and negative outcomes.
Then we may assign, by way of the Bernoulli law, (4.5), utilities to the monetary
outcomes. By doing so, we obtain the following fairness ratio outcomes for a given
probability p of the uncertain proposition, Figures 11 and 12:
Figure 11. Rescaled and rotated figure for positive outcomes
and
Figure 12. Rescaled and rotated figure for negative outcomes
Comparing Figures 11 and 10, we see that by taking into account the initial
wealth m, through the Bernoulli law, (4.5), the fair outcome ratios, as a function of
the probability p for the positive uncertainty outcome Cu, are adjusted downward,
relative to Figure 10. Furthermore, the fairness symmetry point p = 0.5 has been
adjusted downward in Figure 11.
If we have a small initial wealth, Figure 11, and we stand to gain more than we
initially would have gained. Then, for given outcome ratios, we will be more inclined
to accept the possibility of gaining nothing, relative to the case where we have a
large initial wealth, Figure 10, as the pay-out, in terms of subjective consequences,
is relatively higher under a small initial wealth.
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Comparing Figures 12 and 10, we see that by taking into account the initial
wealth m, through the Bernoulli law, (4.5), the fair outcome ratios, as a function of
the probability p for the negative uncertainty outcome Cu, are adjusted upward,
relative to Figure 10. Furthermore, the fairness symmetry point p = 0.5 has been
adjusted upward in Figure 12. These adjustments make nothing but sense.
If we have a small initial wealth, Figure 12, and we stand to lose more than we
initially would have lost. Then, for given outcome ratios, we will be less inclined
to accept the possibility of losing even more, relative to the case where we have a
large initial wealth, Figure 10, as the penalty, in terms of subjective consequences,
is relatively larger under a small initial wealth.
As our initial wealth tends to infinity, and our utility for money becomes linear,
we will perceive both problems to be symmetric, as monetary losses are weighed the
same as monetary gains, Figure 10.
9. The Psychological Certainty Effect, Part II
Risk seeking refers to a specific pattern in betting behavior. Uncertain larger
gains are preferred over sure smaller gains and uncertain larger losses are preferred
over sure smaller losses. The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky state that risk
seeking constitutes one of the minimal challenges that must be met by any adequate
descriptive theory of choice, [63].
The observation that large gains are preferred over sure much smaller gains is
commensurate with the fact that we may prefer high-risk, high-yield investment
opportunities over low-risk, low-yield ones. Likewise, the observation that uncertain
larger losses are preferred over sure smaller, though still substantial, losses is in
accordance with those instances in the past where traders incurred hundreds of
millions in losses, in their attempts to make good on their previous losses23.
If the signs of the outcomes in the risk seeking betting scenarios are reversed, then
the preferences between the bets will also reverse. This is called the reflection effect,
[34]. So, risk seeking in the positive domain is accompanied by risk aversion in the
negative domain. Conversely, risk seeking in the negative domain is accompanied
by risk aversion in the positive domain.
9.1. Risk Seeking I. We first give an example of risk seeking in the case of a small
probability of winning a large prize, that is, risk seeking in the positive domain. This
case of risk seeking represents our tendency to profit maximization and demonstrates
that we will be willing to invest in a long shot if the pay-out is high enough.
23As, for example, happened to Nicholas William Leeson, a trader for the Barrings Bank in the
nineties. Though we believe that Leeson would have acted less recklessly had he been investing his
own money, instead that of the deposit holders. That is, we expect that his Weber constant for his
own money, say, q, was markedly larger than his Weber constant for the deposit holders money,
say, q0, where 0 ≤ q0 << q.
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The outcome probability distributions for the respective bets in our risk seeking
example are
p(O|D1) =
0.001, O = 50000.999, O = 0 (9.1)
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = 5 (9.2)
It is found that 72% of N = 72 subjects prefer decision D1 over D2, [34]. Even
though both bets have the same expectation value of
E (O|D1) = 0.001× 5000 = 5 = 1.0× 5 = E (O|D2) .
We now interpret this finding in terms of the Bayesian decision theoretic framework.
Seeing that Kahneman and Tversky’s Figure 3 of their [63] is in close correspon-
dence with Figure 10, we will assume here a linear utility for monetary outcomes24.
This assumption allows us to use either Figure 7 or Figure 8 to ‘read off’ the
corresponding fair probability.
It is found that the fair probability for the certainty bets (9.1) and (9.2) is given
as:
Pfair = 3.985× 10−6. (9.3)
This fair probability may be checked to correspond with the fair interval, (8.6):
(0, 10) = (0, 2Oc) , (9.4)
where the overshoot in the lower bound is re-set to zero25.
So, if the probability of the uncertain gain exceeds this fair probability, as it
does, then, as our ‘expected’ utility moves away from the equilibrium situation to a
greater expected gain, we will accept the uncertainty bet D1. As the gain in the
utility upper bound under D1 will dominate the gain in the utility lower bound
under D2.
And indeed, it is found that 72% of N = 72 subjects prefer decision D1 over
D2, [34], even though both bets have the same outcome expectation values. The
phenomenon of utility upper bound dominance for gains constitutes risk seeking in
the positive domain.
9.2. Risk Aversion I. The above analysis may also be performed for the case
when there is a small probability of loosing a large sum of money. We then will
see a reversal in the preference for bet D1 over bet D2 to a preference for bet D2
24This assumption is not that far-fetched, seeing that we have here imaginary increments in
an imaginary inital wealth; stated differently, no money will be actually gained or lost, as a
consequence of our decisions. See also Appendix H for a further discussion of the validity of
hypothetical bets.
25See also (6.15).
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over bet D1. Risk aversion in the negative domain represents our tendency to hedge
against large and catastrophic losses.
The outcome probability distributions for the respective bets are26:
p(O|D1) =
0.001, O = −50000.999, O = 0 (9.5)
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = −5 (9.6)
It is found that 83% of N = 72 subjects preferred the bet D2 over D1, [34].
We will again assume here a linear utility for monetary outcomes. This assumption
allows us to use Figure 10 to ‘read off’ the corresponding fair probability.
It is found that the fair probability for the certainty bets (9.5) and (9.6) is given
as:
Pfair = 3.985× 10−6. (9.7)
This fair probability may be checked to correspond with the fair interval, (8.8):
(−10, 0) = (2Oc, 0) , (9.8)
where the overshoot in the upper bound is re-set to zero27.
So, if the probability of the uncertain loss exceeds this fair probability, as it does,
then as our ‘expected’ utility moves away from the equilibrium situation to a greater
expected loss, we will reject the uncertainty bet D1. As the gain in the utility lower
bound under D2 will dominate the gain in the utility upper bound under D1.
And indeed, it is found that 83% of N = 72 subjects prefer decision D2 over
D1, [34], even though both bets have the same outcome expectation values. The
phenomenon of utility lower bound dominance for losses constitutes risk aversion in
the negative domain.
9.3. Risk Seeking II. We now give an example of risk seeking when people must
choose between a sure loss and a substantial probability of a larger loss, that is, risk
seeking in the negative domain. This case of risk seeking represents our tendency to
try to evade large and catastrophic losses.
The outcome probability distributions for the respective bets in our risk seeking
example are
p(O|D1) =
0.8, O = −40000.2, O = 0 (9.9)
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = −3000 (9.10)
26Compare with (9.1) and (9.2).
27See also (6.15).
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It is found that 92% of N = 95 subjects preferred the bet D1 over D2, [34].
If we assume a linear utility for monetary outcomes, then we may use Figure 10
to ‘read off’ the corresponding fair probability. It is found that the fair probability
for the certainty bets (9.9) and (9.10) is given as:
Pfair = 0.8536. (9.11)
This fair probability may be checked to correspond with the fair interval, (8.9):
(−4000,−2000) = (Ou, 2Oc −Ou) , (9.12)
where the overshoot in the lower bound is re-set to minus four thousand28.
So, if the probability of the uncertain loss is less than the fair probability (9.11),
as it is, then as our ‘expected’ utility moves away from the equilibrium situation to
a lesser expected loss, we will accept the uncertainty bet D1. As the gain in the
utility upper bound under D1 will dominate the gain in the lower bound under D2.
And indeed, it is found that 92% of N = 95 subjects prefer decision D1 over D2,
[34], even though D1 has a slightly larger outcome expectation value than D2. The
phenomenon of utility upper bound dominance for losses constitutes risk seeking in
the negative domain.
9.4. Risk Aversion II. The previous analysis may also be performed for the
opposite case of a sure gain and a substantial probability of a larger gain. We then
will see a reversal in the preference for bet D1 over bet D2 to a preference for bet
D2 over bet D1. Risk aversion in the positive domain represents our tendency to
secure our profits.
The outcome probability distributions for this problem of choice are29:
p(O|D1) =
0.8, O = 40000.2, O = 0 (9.13)
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = 3000 (9.14)
It is found that 80% of N = 95 subjects preferred the bet D2 over D1, [34].
If we assume a linear utility for monetary outcomes, then we may use either
Figure 7 or Figure 8 to ‘read off’ the corresponding fair probability. It is found that
the fair probability for the certainty bets (9.13) and (9.14) is given as:
Pfair = 0.8536. (9.15)
28See also (6.15).
29Compare with (9.9) and (9.10).
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This fair probability may be checked to correspond with the fair interval, (8.7):
(2000, 4000) = (2Oc −Ou, Ou) , (9.16)
where the overshoot in the upper bound is re-set to four thousand30.
So, if the probability of the uncertain loss is less than the fair probability (9.15),
as it is, then as our ‘expected’ utility moves away from the equilibrium situation
to a lesser expected gain, we will accept the certainty bet D2. As the gain in the
utility lower bound under D2 will dominate the gain in the upper bound under D1.
And indeed, it is found that 80% of N = 95 subjects prefer decision D2 over D1,
[34], even though D2 has a slightly larger outcome expectation value than D1. The
phenomenon of utility lower bound dominance for gains constitutes risk aversion in
the positive domain.
10. Discussion
In this fact sheet we have presented the case for the Bayesian decision theory.
It may be read in Jaynes’ [30], that to the best of his knowledge, there are as of
yet no formal principles at all for assigning numerical values to loss functions; not
even when the criterion is purely economic, because the utility of money remains
ill-defined. In the absence of these formal principles, Jaynes final verdict was that
decision theory can not be fundamental. This situation may have changed.
The Bernoulli utility function, initially derived by Bernoulli, by way of common
sense first principles31, has now been derived by way of a consistency argument32.
This might explain why it is that Bernoulli’s utility function has proven to be so
ubiquitous and successful the field of sensory perception research; simply because it
is consistent.
The first two algorithmic steps of the Bayesian decision theory, respectively, the
construction of outcome probability distributions by way of the Bayesian probability
theory and the construction of utility probability distributions by way of the
Bernoulli utility function, allow us no freedom. To construct our outcome and utility
probability distributions otherwise, would be to invite inconsistency.
Our initial justification for the Bernoulli utility function had come from the
observation that this function, in the guise of the Weber-Fechner and the Steven’s
power law, had been demonstrated by psycho-physics to be an appropriate model
for the way we humans perceive the increments in sensory stimuli, in terms of
sensation strength. So, if monetary outcomes are considered to be a sensory stimuli,
in the most abstract sense of the word, then it would follow the Bernoulli utility
30See also (6.15).
31See Appendix B.
32See Section 5.
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function would be the most appropriate model for the way we humans perceive the
increments in monetary wealth.
As in the course of our research we came to trust the Bayesian decision algorithm
to teach our intuition, in those instances where the intuitive ‘resolution’ is lacking
to make clear and crisp choices33, the burden fell on us to provide a proof of the
fundamentalness of the Bayesian decision theory.
The history of Bayesian probability theory has taught us that the usefulness of a
theory, in terms of its practical and beautifully intuitive results, in the absence of
a compelling axiomatic basis, provides no safeguard against attacks by those who
choose to close their eyes to this usefulness34. This is why we felt compelled to
search for a consistency derivation of the Bernoulli utility function.
Especially so, since we had taken painstaking care to search out those ‘unyielding
practical realities’, that would put our foundations to the test. And it had been
found that all these practical realities fell nicely in line with the proposed foundations
of the Bayesian decision theory, as may be witnessed in our treatment of the Ellsberg
paradox and the Kahneman and Tversky data on the certainty effect35
So, having presented a consistency proof for the Bernoulli utility function, the
question now is: Is the Bayesian decision theory, just like the Bayesian probability
and information theories, Bayesian in the strictest sense in the word, or, equivalently,
an inescapable consequence of the desideratum of consistency? We will now try to
answer this question.
There is one degree of freedom remaining in the Bayesian decision theory as a
whole. This remaining degree of freedom is the criterion of choice which states
that we should maximize the sum of the lower bound of the utility probability
distribution36.
In any problem of choice we will endeavor to choose that decision which has a
corresponding utility probability distribution that is lying most the right on the
utility axis; that is, we will choose to maximize our utility probability distributions.
In this there is little freedom. But we are free, in principle, to maximize the positions
33Just like we have learned, having been Bayesians for the past ten years, to trust the Bayesian
probability algorithm to teach our intuition, in those instances where the intuitive resolution is
lacking to make clear and crisp plausibility assessments; that is, by analogy, Jaynes’ reasoning
computer of Bayesian probability theory, [30], had become a decision making computer.
34Note that this historical fact explains why Bayesians have their axiomatic house in such good
order. This process started with the work of Cox, [8], was expanded upon by Jaynes, [30], which
was then further refined by the work of Knuth and Skilling, [41]. Moreover, the more general
axiomatic framework of the latter has enabled them, amongst other things, [43], to bring some
order to the field of quantum theory, by showing why this theory is forced to use a complex
arithmetic, [22].
35The Allais paradox corresponds, more or less, with Risk Aversion II in Section9. But one may
take, trivially, any of the proposed Allais paradoxes and solve them with the here proposed decision
algorithm.
36See Section 6.
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of our utility probability distributions any way we see fit. Nonetheless, we believe
that it is always a good policy to take into account all the pertinent information we
have.
For example, if we only maximizes the expected value of the utility probability
distribution, then we will, by definition, neglect the information that the standard
deviation of the utility probability distribution has to bear on our problem of choice,
by way of the symmetry breaking in the case of an overshoot of one of the bounds.
Likewise, we are free to only maximize one of the bounds of our utility probability
distributions, while neglecting the other. But in doing so, we will neglect the
possibility of either (catastrophic) losses in the lower bound or (astronomical) gains
in the upper bound.
In the Bayesian probability theory we have an analogous situation of both con-
straint and freedom. The Bayesian probability theory states that the product and
sum rules of probability theory are the only two consistent and, therefore, admissible
operators to combine probabilities with. But it also states that in our assignment
of our probabilities we are totally free to do as we see fit. There are no ‘wrong’
probability distributions, only better or worse informed ones. It’s all a matter of
choice.
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Appendix A. Bayesian Probability Theory
The whole of Bayesian probability theory flows forth from two simple rules. The
product rule,
P (A)P (B|A) = P (AB) = P (B)P (A|B) , (A.1)
and the sum rule
P
(
A
)
= 1− P (A) . (A.2)
By way of the product and the sum rule, we may derive the generalized sum rule,
P (A+B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (AB) . (A.3)
If we have that the propositions are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, that is,
B = A, we may derive, by way of (A.2), (A.3), and the fact that p
(
AA
)
= 0, the
most primitive probability distribution:
P
(
A+A
)
= P (A) + P
(
A
)
= 1, (A.4)
This probability distribution then may be further generalized, by taken as it propo-
sitional elements the exhaustive and mutual exclusive conjunctions AiBj , to the
bivariate probability distribution:∑
i
∑
j
P (AiBj) = 1, (A.5)
which allows us to ‘marginalize’ over the parameter, say, Bj , which is of no direct
interest:
P (Ai) =
∑
j
P (AiBj) , (A.6)
where ∑
i
P (Ai) = 1. (A.7)
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We may let i and j, that is, the number of propositions Ai and Bj in (A.5), tend
to infinity. By doing so, we go from discrete to continuous probability distributions.
Furthermore, we may add propositions Ck, Dl, Em, etc..., and so get higher variate
distributions.
Now, to a non-Bayesian it may seem to be somewhat surprising, that the whole
of Bayesian probability theory flows forth from the product and rules. But the
whole of Boolean logic37, on an operational level, is also captured by the AND-
and NOT-operations. These operations correspond, respectively, with (A.1) and
(A.2); as these operators combine, with the negation of a NAND-operation, in the
OR-operation, which corresponds with (A.3).
Moreover, it may be shown that Boolean logic is just a special limit case of the
more general Bayesian probability theory. The operators of Boolean logic combine
in a like manner as the operators in Bayesian probability theory. But in Boolean
logic propositions can have only the truth values true or false. Whereas in Bayesian
probability theory propositions can have plausibility values in the interval [0, 1],
where 0 and 1, respectively, correspond with false and true.
So Boolean logic is the language of deduction, whereas Bayesian probability
theory is the language of both induction and deduction; the former being a limit
case of the latter, in which we have absolute knowledge about the propositions in
play.
Now, on the conceptual level Bayesian probability theory is very simple. However,
on an implementation level, when doing an actual data-analysis, it may be quite
challenging38; which, as an aside, makes it fun to do Bayesian statistics. And we
refer the interested reader to [56], for a first cursory overview on the considerations
that come with a Bayesian data-analysis39.
Appendix B. The Ubiquitous Bernoulli Utility Function
The utility of a given outcome is the perceived worth of that outcome. If we take
the utilities that monetary outcomes hold for us to be an incentive for our decisions,
then we may perceive money to be a stimulus.
37We use the term ‘Boolean algebra’ in its meaning as referring to two-valued logic in which
symbols like ‘A’ stand for propositions, [30].
38In close analogy, Boolean logic, which is a specific limit case of Bayesian probability theory, is
simple on the conceptional level. However, on the implementation level it may be quite challenging,
when, say, we use this Boolean logic to design logic circuits for computers.
39Though the absolute autority is [30]. But the reading of this 680-page tome would require a
considerable time investment on the part of the reader. But then again, as Calculus is the royal
highway to the exact sciences, so we have that Jaynes’ Probability Theory: The Logic of Science is
the royal highway to Bayesian statistics.
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For the rich man ten dollars is an insignificant amount of money. So, the prospect
of gaining or losing ten dollars will fail to move the rich man, that is, an increment
of ten dollars for him has an utility which tends to zero.
For the poor man ten dollars is two days worth of groceries and, thus, a significant
amount of money. So, the prospect of gaining or losing ten dollars will most likely
move the poor man to action. It follows that an increment of ten dollars for him
has an utility significantly greater than zero.
We now will give the derivations of the Bernoulli, the Weber-Fechner, and Steven’s
power laws. It will be seen all that these three laws are equivalent.
B.1. The Bernoulli utility function. Consider persons A and B, with A having
a fortune of 100.000 full-ducats, and with B a fortune of 100.000 semi-ducats, a
semi-ducat being the half of a full-ducat. Let fA and fB be the moral value functions,
defined on, respectively, the monetary full-ducat axis x and the semi-ducat axis x˜.
Let xA and x˜B stand for the initial wealths of A and B, respectively; where xA and
x˜B are points on the monetary axes x and x˜, respectively.
Bernoulli derived his law by way of three simple variance considerations for the
moral functions fA and fB , [6, 54]:
(1) For an arbitrary increment c in wealth, the moral movement of this increment
will be less for the rich man, than for the poor man; that is, if we make for
fB the appropriate change of variable, from x˜ to x, then we have that
d
dx
fA (x)
∣∣∣∣
c
<
d
dx
fB (x)
∣∣∣∣
c
.
From which it follows that effect of c on a given f decreases as the initial
wealth increases.
(2) It is proposed that the movement in a general moral value function f , for a
given positive increment dx, is proportional to the value of this increment;
that is,
d
du
f (u)
∣∣∣∣
c=dx
∝ dx,
as this is the simplest function for which f increases as a function of an
increment in x.
(3) Furthermore, it is proposed that this movement in f is inversely proportional
to the value of the initial wealth x; that is,
d
du
f (u)
∣∣∣∣
c=dx
∝ 1
x
.
where ‘∝’ is the proportionality sign.
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Bernoulli arrived at his third consideration, using the following reasoning. The
change in moral value of c full-ducats for A will be half the change in moral value of c
full-ducats for B. Only if either B sees his fortune increased to 200.000 semi-ducats,
or, equivalently, 100.000 full-ducats, or if A sees his fortune reduced to 50.000
full-ducats, or, equivalently, 100.000 semi-ducats, only then will B have the same
change in moral value as A for c full-ducats40. So, if we make for fB the appropriate
change of variable from x˜ to x,
d
dxfA (x)
∣∣
c
d
dxfB (x)
∣∣
c
=
1
2
=
xB
xA
, (B.1)
where xB is the initial fortune of B, translated from the semi-ducat x˜-axis to the
full-ducat x-axis.
It follows from (B.1) that we have, in general, that the change in moral value is
inversely proportional to the initial we hold, that is,
d
dx
f (x)
∣∣∣∣
c
∝ 1
x
, (B.2)
which is Bernoulli’s third consideration.
If we combine the second and the third consideration, we obtain the differential
equation
f ′ (x) = q
dx
x
, (B.3)
which, if solved for the boundary condition that for a given person with an initial
wealth of x0 an increment of zero holds no utility, either negative or positive, gives
f (x) = q log
x
x0
, (B.4)
which may be rewritten as
f (∆x|x0) = q log x0 + ∆x
x0
. (B.5)
B.2. The Weber-Fechner Law. Let S signify stimuli intensity and let Q signify
sensation strength. Weber’s law states that the increment ∆S needed to elicit a
judgment that S + ∆S is just noticeably different from S is proportional to S:
∆S = wS, (B.6)
where w is a positive constant dependent upon the specific type of sensory stimulus
offered and ∆S is understood to be the stimulus increment corresponding with a
just noticeable difference.
Fechner generalized the experimental Weber law by stating that all differences in
sensational strength, and not only the ones that are just noticeable, are proportional
40In these two limit cases the Bernoulli variance argument will tend to the invariance argument
(5.1), which was used in Section 5.
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to the relative change ∆S/S, that is,
∆Q = q
∆S
S
. (B.7)
where k is a positive constant dependent upon the specific type of sensory stimulus
offered and ∆S is now understood to be the stimulus increment corresponding with
the increment in sensation strength ∆Q.
Dividing both sides of (B.7) by ∆S gives
∆Q
∆S
= q
1
S
. (B.8)
Fechner then makes the assumption that, just as a physically small quantity ∆S
can be reduced without limit to the differential dS, so a small quantity of sensation
can be reduced without limit to the differential dQ. By way of this assumption, we
may let (B.8) tend to the differential equation
dQ
dS
= q
1
S
. (B.9)
The general solution of this differential equation is
Q = q logS + c, (B.10)
where c is some constant of integration.
Introducing an initial value condition for (B.9) that says that at stimulus value S0
there is no sensation strength, that is, Q (S0) = 0, leaves us with the Weber-Fechner
law
Q (S|S0) = q log S
S0
, (B.11)
or, equivalently,
Q (∆S|S0) = q log S0 + ∆S
S0
. (B.12)
The Weber-Fechner law, (B.12), is identical to the utility function which had
been proposed a century earlier by Bernoulli, (B.5).
Fechner himself was aware of this equivalence. Nonetheless, he believed his
derivation to be the more general. Fechner argued that Bernoulli’s derivation only
applied to the special case of utility, whereas his law, though identical, applied to
all sensations, as it invokes Weber’s law.
However, as pointed out in [54], Fechner failed to provide any compelling reason
why the principles employed in Bernoulli’s derivation of the subjective value of
objective monies should not be extendible to sensations in general. Nonetheless, we
do believe that Fechner acted in good faith, in denying Bernoulli scientific primacy.
First of all, Fechner called the Weber-Fechner law, when he first published it, very
modestly, the Weber law. Second of all, Fechner had a deep spiritual need for some
kind of harmony between the physical and mental universes, and the Weber-Fechner
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law provided him with this harmony, for this law spoke of the basic oneness of the
physical and mental universes, [15].
The Weber-Fechner law demonstrated that both universes adhered to seemingly
mechanistic laws. It then followed that the freedom of the latter universe, in terms
of free will and volition, implied, by way of analogy, a commensurate freedom of the
former; thus, opening the way for the possibility of a besouled physical universe.
Which had become Fechner’s only hope for spiritual salvation, [15].
We can imagine that Fechner might have felt that a law that assigned subjective
values to objective monies was too arbitrary and sordid a foundation for the lofty
purpose he wished it to serve. In contrast, the initial Weber law allowed Fechner to
forgo of the money argument and derive a law, which though in form identical to
Bernoulli’s, differed in that it applied to all human sensations.
B.3. Steven’s Power Law. Steven’s power law is based on the observation, that
it is the ratio ∆Q/Q, rather than the difference ∆Q, that is proportional to ∆S/S,
[60]. This observation leads to the equality
∆Q
Q
= q
∆S
S
. (B.13)
Letting the differences in Q and S go to differentials, we may rewrite (B.13) as
dQ
Q
= q
dS
S
. (B.14)
This equation has its general solution
logQ = q logS + c′. (B.15)
Taking the exponent of both sides of (B.15), we get the power law for stimulus
perception
Q = cSq, (B.16)
where c = exp (c′).
Stevens found the power law to hold for several sensations; binaural and monaural
loudness, brightness, lightness, smell, taste, temperature, vibration duration, repeti-
tion rate, finger span, pressure on palm, heaviness, force of hand grip, autophonic
response, and electric shock, [60].
The power law is applied by letting subjects compare the sensation ratio of Q1
to Q0 for corresponding stimuli strengths S1 and S0:
Q1
Q0
=
(
S1
S0
)q
. (B.17)
Let S1 = S0 + ∆S, where ∆S is some increment, then we may rewrite (B.17) as
Q1
Q0
=
(
S0 + ∆S
S0
)q
. (B.18)
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For an increment of ∆S = 0, the ratio of perception stimuli will be Q1/Q0 = 1.
Taking the log of the ratio (B.18) we may map the ratio of perceived stimuli to
a corresponding utility scale where a zero increment ∆S corresponds with a zero
utility:
Q′ (∆S|S0) = log Q1
Q0
= q log
S0 + ∆S
S0
(B.19)
But this is just the Weber-Fechner law, (B.13).
B.4. Summary. The Weber-Fechner law gives us just noticeable differences on
a log scale, (B.13). The power law gives us ratios of sensation strengths, (B.18).
Taking the log of the ratio of sensation strengths, we may obtain the just noticeable
differences again, (B.19). But the Weber-Fechner for just noticeable differences is
just the Bernoulli utility function for utilities, (B.5).
We refer the reader to [54], for a discussion of Thurnstone’s derivation of the
satisfaction law. This law, which takes as its input the increment in the number of
items of commodity, is also of the form of Bernoulli’s utility function.
Appendix C. The Negative Bernoulli utility function
In this appendix we present the negative Bernoulli utility function for debts,
which is a corollary of the Bernoulli utility function for income. The negative
Bernoulli utility function predicts that for the very poor, having a small initial
wealth and large initial debts, a large loss of direct income will be more devastating,
than an increase of, say, twice that loss in their long-term debt. This law also
explains why, for these poor, having a small initial wealth and large initial debts,
the temptation to take out loans, if offered the opportunity, will be quite great, [25].
Until now we have treated only the case were the maximal loss did not exceed
the initial wealth m. However, in real life we may lose more than we actually have,
by way of debt. So, we now proceed to assign utilities to increments in debt.
According to the Weber-Fechner law we cannot lose more money than we initially
had. Otherwise we may have that the ratio in the logarithm in the Weber-Fechner
Law, (4.4),
u(∆S|S) = q log S + ∆S
S
, (C.1)
may become negative, leading to a breakdown of the logarithm.
However, whenever we incur a debt we lose more money than we have. Further-
more, we can have a debt and an income, both at same time. So, we propose that
there are two different monetary stimuli dimensions in play; the first dimension
being an actual income dimension and the second dimension being a debt dimension.
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We propose to model the debt utilities by way of the negative Weber-Fechner
law:
u(∆D|D) = −b log D + ∆D
D
, (C.2)
where we let D be the initial debt, ∆D the increment in debt, and b the the Weber
constant of a monetary debt.
The rationale behind (C.2) is as follows. If we view a debt increment as a
stimulus, then it follows that we may use the psycho-physical Weber-Fechner law in
the determination of the moral value of a given debt increment.
For positive increments ∆D, there is an increase in current debt, whereas for
negative increments ∆D, there is a decrease in current debt. In order to assign both
a negative utility to an increase in current debt and positive utility to a decrease in
debt, we need to multiply the Weber-Fechner law times minus one, (C.2).
If we have no initial debt, that is, D = 0, then (C.2) tells us that any positive
increment in debt ∆D would have a utility of minus infinity. This is clearly not
realistic. So, in order to model an increment in debt for those who are without
debt, we must introduce a minimum significant amount of debt which is equal to
minimum significant amount of income, γ.
The threshold amount of debt, γ, may also be used in the case of ∆D = −D, in
order to prevent an infinite utility being assigned to a full repaying of one’s debts.
Using the concept of the minimum significant amount of debt stimulus, we may
modify (C.2) as
u(∆D|D) = −b log D + ∆D
D
, −D + γ < ∆D <∞, (C.3)
If we want to give a graphical representation of (C.3), then the Weber constant
b, must be set to some numerical value.
Say, we have a total debt of forty thousand dollars, in the form of a student loan,
which we eventually will have to pay back, but not right now. Then introspection
would suggest that a increment or decrement of an amount less than a thousand
dollars would not move us that much.
So, ∆D = 1000 constitutes one utile, or, equivalently, a just noticeable difference
in debt for an initial debt of D = 40.000, that is, (4.5):
1 utile = −b log 40.000− 1000
40.000
. (C.4)
If we then solve for the unknown Weber constant b of debt stimuli,
b = − 1
log 390000− log 40000 ≈ 40, (C.5)
we find this Weber constant to be smaller by a factor of 2.5 than the Weber constant
q of income stimuli, (4.7).
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It is well possible that this difference in Weber constants can be attributed to
the difference in abstractness of the concepts. The losing of actual monies is quite
concrete, whereas the accrueing of a debt, repayable somewhere in a distant future,
is somewhat more abstract.
But there is always a chance that these authors were off in their introspection41,
and that both Weber constants should be approximately equal. We leave this issue,
together with the psychological reality of the phenomenon of debt relief, given below,
for future psychological experimentation, as we proceed with our discussion of the
debt utilities.
Suppose that a student has a student loan which has accumulated to forty
thousand dollars. Then, by way of (C.2) and (C.5), we obtain the following mapping
of increments in debt to utilities, Figure 13.
Figure 13. Utility plot for initial debt 40.000 dollars
As stated previously, loss aversion is the phenomenon that losses may loom
larger than gains. In Figure 13 we see the phenomenon that debt reduction may
loom larger than debt increase. We will call this corollary of the psycho-physical
Weber-Fechner law: ‘debt relief’, the relief of loosing one’s debts.
Now, does the phenomenon of debt relief correspond with a real psychological
phenomenon? We belief that it actually does.
Say, we have a debt of a a thousand dollars. Then we can imagine ourselves
feeling greatly reliefed, were we to be released of our debt. Now, were our debt,
instead, to be doubled to two thousand dollars, then we can also imagine ourselves
41Note that actual value of the Weber constant b of the debt stimuli has no direct bearing on
any of the results given in this fact sheet; save the handful of examples which are given in this
section, in order to demonstrate the qualitative behavior of the negative Bernoulli utility function,
or, equivalently, the negative Weber-Fechner law.
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feeling unhappy about this. But this feeling of unhappiness about the doubling of
our debt would be of a lesser intensity than the corresponding relief of having our
debt acquitted.
We will now look at the practical implications of the negative Bernoulli utility
function, (C.2), and its Weber constant b, (C.5).
A student loan initially represents a gain in debt stimulus. This debt makes
itself felt, in terms of actual loss of income, only after graduation, the moment the
monthly payments have to be paid and take a considerable chunk out of one’s actual
income.
Say, that the student of Figure 13, having become a PhD, and having a net
income of fifteen hundred dollars, is called upon to make good on his loan, by way
of monthly payments of five hundred dollars. Then these payments represent both
a loss in income, having a negative utility of, (C.1) and (4.7):
u(income-loss) = 100 log
1500− 500
1500
= −41.5, (C.6)
as well as a decrements in debt, having a positive utility of, (C.2) and (C.5):
u(debt-decrease) = −40 log 40000− 500
40000
= 0.5, (C.7)
It follows that our PhD can find little to no comfort in the fact that he is paying
of his debt, as he acutely feels the sting of loss of income. This is, together with
the difference in Weber constants42, (4.7) and (C.5), reflective of the fact that his
utility function for income is highly non-linear in the neighborhood of the increment,
whereas his utility function for debt is highly linear in that region.
Now, say that we have another PhD, who during his student days lived a more
frugal life style and, consequently, only has a debt of two thousand dollars. For this
PhD student, when called upon to make good on the loan, the loss of income will
be felt just as keenly, with a negative utility of u = −40.5, (C.6). However, he will
find more satisfaction in the fact that he is paying of his debts, (C.2) and (C.5):
u(debt-decrease) = −40 log 2000− 500
2000
= 11.5, (C.8)
seeing that he has a more curved utility function for debt than our previous PhD
student.
Nonetheless, the first PhD student may feel, after a couple of years of monthly
repayments, when his loan has been reduced to twenty thousand dollars, for the
first time, as if he has an actual stake in the repayment of his debt, (C.2) and (C.5):
u(debt-decrease) = −40 log 20000− 500
20000
= 1.0, (C.9)
42A difference which accounts only for a factor of 2.5 in the observed differences of the utilities
(C.6) and (C.7).
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as his debt repayment utility crosses the threshold of the just noticeable difference.
The negative Bernoulli utility function also gives an explanation why for the very
poor, having a minimum monthly wage of seven hundred euros, and already having
a large debt of, say, twenty thousand euros, a loss of income of, say, five hundred
euros, is perceived to be so much more devastating than an increase in debt of, say,
a thousand euros. As for this poor person, the loss of actual income has a negative
utility of −125 utiles and the gain of an increase of has a negative utility of only −2
utiles43.
Likewise, the temptation for the very poor, if offered the opportunity, to take
out a loan of a thousand euros will be quite great. As for this poor person, the
immediate gain of a direct increase of a thousand euros in income will have a positive
utility of +89 utiles, whereas the negative utility of an increase in debt of a thousand
dollars will have a negative utility of only −2 utiles44, [25].
Appendix D. Bayesian Inference
Bayesian statistics is not only said to be common sense quantified, but also
common sense amplified45, having a much higher ‘probability resolution’ than our
human brains can ever hope to achieve [30].
This statement is in accordance with the Kahneman and Tversky finding that, if
presented with some chance of a success, p, subjects fail to draw the appropriate
binomial probability distribution of the number of successes, r, in n draws. Even
though subjects manage to find the expected number of successes, they fail to
accurately determine the probability spread of the r successes. Kahneman and
Tversky see this as evidence that humans are fundamentally non-Bayesian in the
way they do their inference, [32].
We instead propose that human common sense is not hard-wired for problems
involving sampling distributions. Otherwise there would be no need for such a
thing as data-analysis, as we only would have to take a quick look at our sufficient
statistics after which we then would draw the probability distributions of interest.
However, humans do seem to be hard-wired for more ‘Darwinian’ problems of
inference.
For example, if we are told that our burglary alarm has gone off, after which
we are also told that a small earthquake has occurred in the vicinity of our house
around the time that the alarm went off. Then common sense would suggest that
the additional information concerning the occurrence of a small earthquake will
43Even if b = 100, (C.5), this negative utility will only be −5 utiles.
44Idem.
45If Bayesian inference were not common sense amplified, then it could not ever hope to enjoy the
successes it currently enjoys in the various fields of science; astronomy, astrophysics, chemistry,
image recognition, etc...
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somehow modify our probability assessment of there actually being a burglar in the
house.
We may use Bayesian probability theory to examine how the knowledge of a
small earthquake having occurred translates to our state of knowledge regarding the
plausibility of a burglary. The narrative we will formally analyze is taken from [53]:
Fred lives in Los Angeles and commutes 60 miles to work. Whilst
at work, he receives a phone-call from his neighbor saying that
Fred’s burglar alarm is ringing. While driving home to investigate,
Fred hears on the radio that there was a small earthquake that day
near his home.
The propositions that will go in our Bayesian inference network are:
B = Burglary,
B = No burglary,
A = Alarm,
A = No alarm,
E = Small earthquake,
E = No earthquake,
where we will distinguish between two states of knowledge:
I1 = State of knowledge where hypothesis of earthquake is also entertained
I2 = State of knowledge where hypothesis of earthquake is not entertained
We assume that the neighbor would never phone if the alarm is not ringing and
that the radio report is trustworthy too; thus, we know for a fact that the alarm is
ringing and that a small earthquake has occurred near the home. Furthermore, we
assume that the occurrence of an earthquake and a burglary are independent. We
also assume that a burglary alarm is almost certainly triggered by either a burglary
or a small earthquake or both, that is,
P
(
A|BEI1
)
= P
(
A|BEI1
)
= P (A|BEI1)→ 1, (D.1)
whereas alarms in the absence of both a burglary and a small earthquake are
extremely rare, that is,
P
(
A|B EI1
)→ 0. (D.2)
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But if, in our state of knowledge, we do not entertain the possibility of an earthquake,
then (D.1) and (D.2) will, respectively, collapse to
P (A|BI2)→ 1, (D.3)
and
P
(
A|BI2
)→ 0. (D.4)
Let
P (E) = e, P (B) = b. (D.5)
Then we have, by way of the sum rule (A.2),
P
(
E
)
= 1− e, P (B) = 1− b. (D.6)
If we are in a state of knowledge where we allow for an earthquake, we have, by
way of the product rule (A.1), as well as (D.1), (D.2), (D.5), and (D.6), that
P
(
ABE
∣∣ I1) = P (A|BEI1)P (B)P (E)→ b (1− e) ,
P
(
ABE
∣∣ I1) = P (A|BEI1)P (B)P (E)→ (1− b) e,
(D.7)
P (ABE| I1) = P (A|BEI1)P (B)P (E)→ be,
P
(
AB E
∣∣ I1) = P (A|B EI1)P (B)P (E)→ 0.
By way of ‘marginalization’, that is, an application of the generalized sum rule,
(A.3), we obtain the probabilities
P
(
AB
∣∣ I1) = P (AB E∣∣ I1)+ P (ABE∣∣ I1)→ (1− b) e,
(D.8)
P (AB| I1) = P (ABE| I1) + P
(
ABE
∣∣ I1)→ b,
and
P (A| I1) = P (AB| I1) + P
(
AB
∣∣ I1)→ b+ e− be, (D.9)
and
P
(
AE
∣∣ I1) = P (ABE∣∣ I1)+ P (AB E∣∣ I1)→ b (1− e) ,
(D.10)
P (AE| I1) = P (ABE| I1) + P
(
ABE
∣∣ I1)→ e.
But if we are in a state of knowledge where we do not allow for an earthquake,
we have, by way of the product rule (A.1), as well as (D.3), (D.4), (D.5), and (D.6),
FACT SHEET, PART I 49
that
P (AB| I2) = P (A|BI2)P (B)→ b,
(D.11)
P
(
AB
∣∣ I2) = P (A|BI2)P (B)→ 0,
By way of ‘marginalization’, that is, an application of the generalized sum rule,
(A.3), we obtain the probability
P (A| I2) = P (AB| I2) + P
(
AB
∣∣ I2)→ b. (D.12)
The moment Fred hears that his burglary alarm is going off, then there are two
possibilities.
One possibility is that Fred may be new to Los Angeles and, consequently,
overlook the possibility of a small earthquake triggering his burglary alarm, that is,
his state of knowledge is I2, which will make his prior probability of his alarm going
off, go to (D.12).
Fred then assesses, by way of the product rule (A.1),(D.11) and (D.12), the
likelihood of a burglary to be
P (B|AI2) = P (AB| I2)
P (A| I2) →
b
b
= 1, (D.13)
which leaves him greatly distressed, as he drives to his home to investigate.
Another possibility is that Fred is a veteran Los Angeleno and, as a consequence,
instantly will take into account the hypothesis of a small tremor occurring near his
house, that is, his state of knowledge is I1.
Fred then assesses, by way of the product rule (A.1),(D.8) and (D.9), the likelihood
of a burglary to be
P (B|AI1) = P (AB| I1)
P (A| I1) →
b
b+ e− be ≈
b
b+ e
, (D.14)
seeing that b+ e >> be.
If earthquakes are somewhat more common than burglaries, then Fred, based on
his (D.13), may still hope for the best, as he drives home to investigate.
Either way, the moment that Fred hears on the radio that a small earthquake has
occurred near his house, around the time when the burglary alarm went off, then,
by way of the product rule (A.1) and (D.7) and (D.10), Fred updates the likelihood
of a burglary to be
P (B|AEI1) = P (ABE| I1)
P (AE| I1) →
be
e
= b. (D.15)
In the presence of an alternative explanation for the triggering of the burglary alarm,
that is, a small earthquake occurring, the burglary alarm has lost its predictive
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power over the prior probability of a burglary, that is, (D.5) and (D.15),
P (B|AEI1)→ P (B) . (D.16)
Consequently, Fred’s fear for a burglary, as he rides home, after having heard
that a small earthquake did occur, will only be dependent upon his assessment of
the general likelihood of a burglary occurring. If we assume that Fred lives in a
nice neighborhood, rather than some crime-ridden ghetto, then we can imagine that
Fred will be, if not greatly, then at least somewhat, relieved.
One of the arguments made against Bayesian probability theory as a normative
model for human rationality is that people are generally numerical illiterate. Hence,
the Bayesian model is deemed to be too numerical a model for human inference,
[59].
However, note that the Bayesian analysis given here was purely qualitative, in
that no actual numerical values were given to our probabilities, apart from (D.1),
(D.3), (D.2), and (D.4), which are limit cases of certainty and, hence, in a sense,
may also be considered to be qualitative.
Moreover, the result of this qualitative analysis seems to be intuitive enough.
Indeed, the qualitative correspondence of the product and sum rules with common
sense has been noted and demonstrated time and again by many distinguished
scientists, including Laplace [44], Keynes [36], Jeffreys [31], Polya [51, 52], Cox [9],
Tribus [61], de Finetti [17], Rosenkrantz [55], and Jaynes [30].
As an aside, Jaynes warns us in [30] that in any Bayesian inference problem we
must conditionalize on our state of knowledge Ii. These authors were very well aware
of this warning. Nonetheless, in our initial discussion of this toy problem we did
heed Jaynes’ warning. Because of the perceived gain in notational compactness. But
to ignore Jaynes’ warnings is to invite the potential for confusion, as we ourselves
found out.
This object lesson notwithstanding, we will not conditionalize on our state of
knowledge in our further discussion of the Bayesian decision theory. Our excuse
for this lack in Bayesian rigor is that our decisions will be assumed to be based
on an ‘universal’ prior state of knowledge, [56], which will allow us, for the sake of
notational compactness, to drop the extra symbol Ii.
Appendix E. Bernoulli’s Error
Kahneman dedicates in his Nobel lecture a whole section on ‘Bernoulli’s error’
and on how prospect theory may remedy this error, [35].
In Kahneman’s Nobel lecture we may read the following on Bernoulli’s error:
The idea that decision makers evaluate outcomes by the utility
of final asset positions has been retained in economic analyses for
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almost 300 years. This is rather remarkable, because the idea is
easily shown to be wrong; I call it Bernoulli’s error. Bernoulli’s
model is flawed because it is reference-independent: it assumes that
the value that is assigned to a given state of wealth does not vary
with the decision maker’s initial state of wealth.
So, Bernoulli’s model is claimed to be in error in that it would evaluate outcomes
by the utility of final asset positions alone, without taking into account the initial
wealth of the decision maker.
But it may be checked, Paragraph 10 of [6], that Bernoulli gives an utility function
of the form:
u (S|S0) = q log S
S0
. (E.1)
where, adopting the Kahneman’s terminology, S and S0 are, respectively, the final
and initial asset states. Let the asset increment ∆S be defined as
∆S = S − S0. (E.2)
Then, by substituting (E.2) into (E.1), we obtain the equivalent utility function,
(4.5):
u (∆S|S0) = q log S0 + ∆S
S0
. (E.3)
It follows that in Bernoulli’s expected utility theory asset increments ∆S, be they
positive or negative, are evaluated relative to the initial wealth S0 of the decision
maker.
This then begs the question: What was it, that led Kahneman to the misguided
belief that in Bernoulli’s model the gains and losses are not the carriers of utility?
Kahneman and Tversky state the first two tenets46 of expected utility theory to
be, respectively, the tenets of expectation and asset integration, [34]. The tenet of
expectation is
U(x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) = p1u(x1) + · · ·+ pnu(xn) . (E.4)
The tenet of asset integration states that if w is our current asset position, that is,
our initial wealth, then we will accept an uncertain prospect having outcomes xi if
U(w + x1, p1; . . . ;w + xn, pn) > u(w) . (E.5)
By substituting (E.4) into (E.5), we obtain the implied asset integration tenet:
p1u(w + x1) + · · ·+ pnu(w + xn) > u(w) . (E.6)
But then we have that the tenets of expectation and asset integration, as stated by
Kahneman and Tversky, are incompatible with Bernoulli’s expected utility theory.
46The third, and last, tenet is that of loss aversion, which states that u must be some concave
down function. The Bernoulli utility function is concave down.
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For the expectation tenet (E.4), Bernoulli’s expected utility theory [6] implies
the function u:
u(x) = q log
w + x
w
, (E.7)
whereas, under the asset integration tenet (E.6), the implied function u would be
u(x) = q log x. (E.8)
By way of (E.7), (E.8), and the fact that
q log
w + x
w
6= q log x,
it is then demonstrated that the two tenets, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
in their [34], are incompatible with Bernoulli’s expected utility theory.
By dropping the expectation tenet (E.4), while retaining the asset integration in
its form of (E.6), we may, very easily, do away with the Kahneman and Tversky
inconsistency.
By substituting the implied (E.8) into the asset integration tenet (E.6), we find47:
p1 [q log(w + x1)] + · · ·+ pn [q log(w + xn)] > q log(w) , (E.9)
Then, by way of the properties of the log function, we may rewrite (E.9) into the
equivalent
p1
[
q log
w + x1
w
]
+ · · ·+ pn
[
q log
w + xn
w
]
> 0, (E.10)
which for any psychologist should be recognizable as the weighted sum of Weber-
Fechner utilities48.
Especially, if those psychologists, like Kahneman and Tversky, explicitly state
that the facts of perceptual adaptation were in their minds when they began their
joint research on decision making under risk, [35].
So, if it is claimed by Kahneman and Tversky [34] that Bernoulli’s model is in
error, as it would evaluate outcomes by the utility of final asset states alone, rather
than gains or losses. Then we may infer that Kahneman and Tversky did not fully
47Note that Laplace [44] discusses Bernoulli’s suggestion by way of the equivalent inequality:
p1 log(w + x1) + · · ·+ pn log(w + xn) > log(w) .
48The Weber-Fechner law is used, amongst other things, to determine the decibel scale of human
sound perception, where the Weber constant has been experimentally determined as q = 10
log 10
.
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realize49 that, according to Bernoulli [6], their abstract (E.6) necessarily implies the
concrete (E.10).
At the end of the quote on Bernoulli’s error50 we may find the following cryptic
footnote by Kahneman:
What varies with wealth in Bernoulli’s theory is the response to
a given change of wealth. This variation is represented by the
curvature of the utility function for wealth. Such a function cannot
be drawn if the utility of wealth is reference-dependent, because
utility then depends not only on current wealth but also on the
reference level of wealth.
We now will offer up an interpretation of what is stated in this footnote; as it may
shed some further light on the Kahneman and Tversky position.
Let us assume that Kahneman and Tversky had at least some sense of what is
written in, and here we quote Kahneman, [35], ‘the brilliant essay that introduced
the first version of expected utility theory (Bernoulli, 1738)’; that is, we assume
that they were aware of the fact that Bernoulli proposes to use the log function, in
some shape or form, in order to assign utilities to outcomes.
Then it may well have been that Kahneman and Tversky were under the wrongful
impression that Benoulli’s utility function is given as
u = q log (w + x) , (E.11)
The first two sentences in the footnote then may be interpreted as expressing the
idea that, with differing levels of wealth w, the supposed utility function (E.11) will
be more or less linear in a given change of wealth x.
If in the third sentence we let ‘current wealth’ stand for change in wealth and
‘reference level of wealth’ for initial state of wealth, then we may interpret it as
stating that (E.11) misses the necessary structure to take into account the initial
state of wealth in its utility assignments.
Bernoulli’s supposed error then would be that he proposed as his utility function
(E.11). But Bernoulli proposed (E.7) instead of (E.11).
The erroneous utility function (E.11) is problematic in that it cannot assign a
value of zero to a change of wealth of x = 0. In Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect
49In all fairness, we ourselves initially thought that we had improved on the insurance example
given by Jaynes in his [30], by using the Weber-Fechner law, which we still remembered from our
psychology days, rather than Laplace’s
p1 [log(w + x1)] + · · ·+ pn [log(w + xn)] > log(w) .
But it was professor Han Vrijling, to whom we owe a debt of gratitude, who first pointed us to
Bernoulli’s [6], and the equivalence of the Weber-Fechner law and the Bernoulli utility function. It
was only then, that we realized that Laplace’s formulation is equivalent to (E.10).
50Given at the beginning of the chapter.
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theory we have that changes in wealth x are assigned values by way of the value
function v, where51
v(x) = 0, for x = 0. (E.12)
So, if we read in [35]:
Preferences appeared to be determined by attitudes to gains and
losses, defined relative to a reference point, but Bernoulli’s theory
and its successors did not incorporate a reference point. We therefore
proposed an alternative theory of risk, in which the carriers of utility
are gains and losses - changes of wealth rather than states of wealth.
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) embraces the idea
that preferences are reference-dependent, and includes the extra
parameter that is required by this assumption.
Then we may interpret is as saying that the erroneous u cannot assign zero utilities
to zero outcomes, whereas Kahneman and Tversky’s value function v can.
It would then follow that that which is embraced by prospect theory is the
constraint52 (E.12) on the value function v. But this constraint also holds, trivially,
for Bernoulli’s utility function (E.7).
Now, after having established some tentative understanding into the reasoning
process that might have led Kahneman and Tversky to their misunderstanding of
Bernoulli’s position, and after having provided a possible interpretation of Kahne-
man’s footnote, we may start to wonder: We know how the initial wealth w factors
into Bernoulli’s expected utility theory, but how does this initial wealth factor into
prospect theory?
We quote Kahneman and Tversky [34]:
The emphasis on changes as the carriers of value should not be
taken to imply that the value of a particular change is independent
of initial position. Strictly speaking, value should be treated as
a function in two arguments: the asset position that serves as
a reference point, and the magnitude of the change (positive or
negative) from that reference point.
And we could not agree more, though we ourselves would have dropped the ‘strictly
speaking’ modifier, as it weakens the imperative. Kahneman and Tversky continue:
However, the preference order of prospects is not greatly altered by
small or even moderate variations in asset position. . . . Consequently,
51Note, Kahneman and Tversky’s two-part value function is given as, [63]:
v(x) =
{
xα, x ≥ 0
−λ (−x)β , x < 0
.
52Constraints are not the same as parameters.
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the representation of value as a function in one argument generally
provides a satisfactory approximation.
So, it is Kahneman himself rather than Bernoulli, who does not take explicitly
into account the decision maker’s initial state of wealth53.
Appendix F. The Case Against Bayes; A Reprensentative Example.
The psychological paradigm of heuristics and biases originated as a reaction to
the shortcomings of the mathematical expected utility theory.
In the 1950’s it was found that expected utility theory, the then dominant decision
theory, failed to adequately model human decision making in certain instances,
leading to such paradoxes as the Ellsberg and Allais paradox. Consequently, Edwards
and his research team of PhD-students and post-docs took it upon themselves to
remedy the situation, [50].
Kahneman and Tversky, both post-docs under Edwards, proposed to construct
a systematic theory about the psychology of uncertainty and judgment. In this
psychological theory a handful of heuristics would replace the mathematical laws
of chance as a more realistic model for subjective judgment of uncertainty. But
what started as a parsimonious theory of human inference, consisting of only three
heuristics and their associated biases, [35], has proliferated into 20 heuristics and
an impressive 170+ biases54.
Heuristics are said to be mental short cuts or ‘rules of thumb’ humans use to do
inference. It is theorized that, as we do not always have the time or resources to
compare all the information at hand, we use heuristics to do inference quickly and
efficiently.
However, or so we are warned, even though these mental short cuts will be helpful
most of the times, if used carelessly heuristics may lead to heuristic-induced biases,
that is, systematic errors in reasoning, [35].
For example, when we use the representativeness heuristic then we estimate the
likelihood of an event by comparing it to an existing prototype that already exists
in our minds, [33].
Our prototype is what we think is the most relevant or typical example of
a particular event or object. The bias associated with the representativeness
heuristic is that when making judgments based on representativeness we are likely
to overestimate the likelihood that the representative event will occur; just because
an event or object is representative does not mean that it is more likely to occur.
In order to demonstrate this bias Kahneman and Tversky performed the following
experiment, [33]. They divided the participants in their study up into three groups.
53As may be checked in the previous footnote.
54Source Wikipedia, search ‘heuristics’ and ‘list of cognitive biases’.
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The base-rate group was asked to guess the percentage of all first-year graduate
students in the following nine fields of specialization: business administration,
computer science, engineering, humanities and education, law, library science,
medicine, physics, and social sciences.
The base-rate group estimated the highest percentage of graduate students, with
20%, to be in humanities and education, and the second lowest percentage, with
7%, to be in computer sciences.
The similarity group was presented with the following profile:
Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity.
He has a need for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in
which every detail finds its appropriate place. His writing is rather
dull and mechanical, occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny
puns and by flashes of imagination of the sci-fi type. He has a strong
drive for competence. He seems to feel little sympathy for other
people and does not enjoy interacting with others. Self-centered,
he nonetheless has a deep moral sense.
After which they were asked to rate how similar Tom was perceived to be to the
typical graduate student in each of the nine graduate specializations.
The similarity group assigned computer science the highest ranking position, with
a mean similarity of 2.1, whereas humanities and education was assigned the second
lowest ranking position, with a mean similarity ranking of 7.2.
The prediction group was given the same personality sketch of Tom as the
similarity group, with the following additional information:
The preceding personality sketch of Tom W. was written during
Tom’s senior year in high school by a psychologist, on the basis of
projective tests. Tom W. is currently a graduate student.
Then they were asked to rank the nine fields of graduate specialization in order of
the likelihood that Tom was now a graduate student in each of these fields.
It was found that 95% of the prediction group judged that Tom was more likely
to study computer science than humanities and education.
Since the likelihood rankings of the prediction group closely follow the similarity
rankings of the similarity group, whereas they do not follow the base-rate estimates
of the base-rate group, Kahneman and Tversky conclude that the representativeness
heuristic must have been used by the participants in the prediction group, [33].
However, the use of representativeness does not necessarily imply the represen-
tativeness heuristic. We quote Kahneman and Tversky on the representativeness
heuristic, [32]:
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Our thesis is that, in many situations, an event A1 is judged more
probable than an event A2 whenever A1 appears more representative
than A2. In other words, the ordering of events by their subjective
probabilities coincides with their ordering by representativeness.
We now will give a formal analysis of the representativeness heuristic, as proposed
by Kahneman and Tversky.
Let
A1 = Computer Science Student
A2 = Humanities and Education Student
B = Profile
If Tom’s psychological profile, B, is more representative of computer science students,
A1, than of humanities students, A2, then
P (B|A1) > P (B|A2) , (F.1)
or, equivalently,
P (B|A1)
P (B|A2) > 1. (F.2)
So, the representativeness heuristic is build upon the thesis:
P (B|A1)
P (B|A2) > 1 =⇒
P (A1|B)
P (A2|B) > 1, (F.3)
where ‘ =⇒ ’ is the symbol for logical implication.
However, thesis (F.3) is unfounded in that it does not follow directly from the
rules of plausible reasoning. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky seem to intuit as
much; seeing that they warn us for the bias of base rate neglect, when using their
representativeness thesis, [33].
By taking the conclusion part in the thesis (F.3) as the starting point of a formal
Bayesian analysis, we may find, by way of the product rule
P (A)P (B|A) = P (AB) = P (B)P (A|B) ,
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that
P (A1|B)
P (A2|B) =
P (B)
P (B)
P (A1|B)
P (A2|B)
=
P (A1B)
P (A2B)
(F.4)
=
P (A1)
P (A2)
P (B|A1)
P (B|A2) .
It follows that the correct thesis, which actually does take into account the base
rate, would be
P (B|A1)
P (B|A2) >
P (A2)
P (A1)
=⇒ P (A1|B)
P (A2|B) > 1. (F.5)
Kahneman and Tversky make in [33] the implicit assumption that the reported use
of representativeness, that is, an evaluation and use of the odds (F.2), as reported by
the participants of the prediction group, necessarily implies their thesis (F.3). This
leads them to conclude that the participants must have used their representativeness
heuristic.
However, it can be seen that this assumption is incorrect, as the Bayesian thesis
(F.5) also makes use of the odds in (F.2) and, thus, representativeness. Moreover,
based on the reported use of representativeness and the experimental data, one
could make the case that the participants in the experiment intuitively made use of
the correct (F.5), instead of the erroneous (F.3).
Kahneman and Tversky report that the prior odds for humanities and education
against computer science were estimated by the participants to be, [33]:
P (A2)
P (A1)
≈ 3. (F.6)
Now, (F.4), or, equivalently, thesis (F.5), tells us that (F.6) together with
P (B|A1)
P (B|A2) > 3 (F.7)
implies the conclusion
P (A1|B)
P (A2|B) > 1, (F.8)
or, equivalently,
P (A1|B) > P (A2|B) . (F.9)
So, if 95% of the participants in the third group judged that Tom was more likely
to study computer science than humanities, then we may infer that 95% of the
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participants deemed the odds-inequality (F.7) to hold, which in our opinion is not
that far-fetched55.
Kahneman and Tversky, however, by way of an informational accuracy argument,
are of the opinion that the plausibility judgments of the participants in the third
group ‘drastically violate the rules of the normative [that is, Bayesian] rules of
prediction’, seeing that the following considerations were ignored by the participants
in the prediction group, [33]:
First given the notorious invalidity of projective personality tests, it
is very likely that Tom W. was never in fact as compulsive and as
aloof as his description suggests. Second, even if the description was
valid when Tom W. was in high school, it may not longer be valid
now that he is in graduate school. Finally, even if the description is
still valid, there are probably more people who fit that description
among students of humanities and education than among students of
computer science, simply because there are so many more students
in the former than in the latter field.
As to the last consideration, it follows from the Bayesian ‘heuristic’ (F.5) that the
inference of Tom being a computer science student implies the corollary inference
that among all the graduate students who fit Tom’s description there will be more
students of computer science than students of humanities and education. Even if
there are many more students in the field of humanities and education than in the
field of computer science.
The odds (F.6) represent the ratio of humanities and education students to
computer science students. Whereas the odds (F.7) represent the ratio of computer
students having a profile like Tom’s to humanities and eduction students having
a like profile. If the latter odds dominate the former, then we must conclude, by
way of (F.4), that there are probably more people who fit Tom’s description among
students of computer science than among students of humanities and education;
that is, P (A1B) > P (A2B). Which invalidates Kahneman’s and Tversky’s last
consideration56.
This, then, leaves us with the following arguments for the thesis that people tend
to neglect the base rate, when taking the mental shortcut (F.3), thus, violating the
rules of the normative [that is, Bayesian] rules of prediction:
55Indeed, the ranking of computer sciences was, with a mean similarity of 2.1, more than three
times higher than the ranking of humanities, which had a mean similarity ranking of only 7.2, [33].
Even though rankings do not translate easily to probabilities, as a sine qua non, this ordering of
similarity rankings still constitutes corroborating evidence for inequality (F.7) to have held for the
participants in the Kahneman and Tversky experiment.
56And as a further consequence, we also grow to doubt Kahneman and Tversky’s competency
somewhat, when it comes to matters of the normative rules of prediction.
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(1) given the notorious [that is, clinical] invalidity of projective personality tests,
it is very likely that Tom W. was never in fact as compulsive and as aloof
as his description suggests.
(2) even if the description was valid when Tom W. was in high school, it may
not longer be valid now that he is in graduate school.
Now, it would seem that these arguments pertain to some other thesis, namely,
that the participants of the prediction group should have disregarded the description
of Tom altogether, as no data was actually given. But this alternative thesis, apart
from it not being the issue57, is not all that compelling.
Because, if, in answer to the first argument, we filter out those qualifications which
might point to compulsiveness and aloofness, then we are left with the following
profile for Tom:
• high intelligence,
• dull and mechanical writing,
• lacking in true creativity,
• corny puns,
• flashes of imagination of the sci-fi type,
• strong drive for competence,
• deep moral sense,
which tells us quite a lot.
It tells us that Tom is very bright, does not like to read, as he apparently is not
that lyrical in his writing, is not very artistic, has a sense of humor, has a passion
for sci-fi, is disciplined, and has a sense of justice58.
As to the second argument, which is also the hardest to answer. It is taught at
the psychology courses, that personality traits tend to be stable over long periods
of time. So, if Tom did not like to write in high school59, than chances are that he
would pick a field op specialization in which he would not have to read and write a
lot. Which would make humanities and education less probable a field of choice,
and computer sciences a more probable one.
But, lest we forget, the original thesis under discussion was that normative rules
of prediction tend to be neglected, as people tend to neglect the base rate; not the
alternative thesis that the prediction group should have disregarded the description
of Tom, because of the clinical invalidity of projective personality tests and the
possibility that Tom might have changed his personality over the course of the few
years between high school and college.
57Though Kahneman and Tversky have made it the issue, by way of their informational accuracy
argument.
58Moreover, what is left out also gives us some tentative information on Tom’s psychologist.
59A liking, admittedly, is not a personality trait, but still.
FACT SHEET, PART I 61
If Kahneman and Tversky wish to prove their initial thesis, then at this point,
having presented their experimental data, they should proceed to demonstrate that
their subjects could not possibly have used the normative, that is, Bayesian, rules
of prediction, as those rules would have implied results other than those that were
observed. Which they do not.
Having come to the end of our discussion of the representative heuristic, we find
that the reported plausibility judgments by the prediction group are not inconsistent
with a possible use of the Bayesian ‘heuristic; (F.6) through (F.9), seeing that the
odds (F.7) may be assumed to lie in the realm of the possible. This leaves the
Kahneman and Tversky experiment inconclusive.
Appendix G. Non-Linear Preferences
Tversky and Kahneman [63], state that non-linear preferences constitute one of
the minimal challenges that must be met by any adequate descriptive theory of
choice. We shall explain.
If we have a bet which has the following outcome probability distributions
p(O|D1) =
{
1, O = 1.000.000 (G.1)
and
p(O|D2) =
0.99, O = 5.000.0000.01, O = 0 (G.2)
then people will typically prefer the bet D1 over D2.
In contrast, if we have a bet which has the following outcome probability distri-
butions
p(O|D1) =
0.90, O = 1.000.0000.10, O = 0 (G.3)
and
p(O|D2) =
0.89, O = 5.000.0000.11, O = 0 (G.4)
then people will typically prefer the bet D2 over D1.
Allais gave this example, in a slightly altered form, to demonstrate that Savage’s
fifth axiom of independence does not hold, [4].
According to Savage’s independence axiom, which we most emphatically do not
endorse, we may add for both (G.1) and (G.2) a probability mass of 0.10 to the
proposition u = 0, while subtracting that same probability mass for the respective
propositions u = 5.000.000 and u = 1.000.000, leading to (G.3) and (G.4), and still
maintain the same problem of choice. But this assumption, as one would hope, is
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shown to be incorrect by the observed reversal in preferences from bet D1 over D2
to bet D2 over D1.
Now, according to Kahneman and Tversky the example by Allais not only refutes
Savage’s axiom of independence, but it also shows that the difference between
probabilities of 0.99 and 1.00 has more impact on preferences than the difference
between 0.10 and 0.11.
Kahneman and Tversky find this observation to be so full of meaning that they
deem it to be a psychological phenomenon in and of itself, and proceed to label it as
the ‘certainty effect’, [34], which later turns into ‘non-linear preferences’, [63]. But
for Bayesians the phenomenon of non-linear preferences is both not that special and
not that new60.
While working on the German enigma code, during World War II, Good61 and
Turing introduced the ‘deciban’ measure which is measured in decibans:
deciban(P ) = 10 log10
P
1− P , (G.5)
and which gives the plausibility of a proposition being true, relative to it not being
true, [21].
For undecidedness, that is, for a fifty-fifty change of some hypothesis A being
true, we have
P = 1− P = 0.5. (G.6)
Substituting (G.6) in (G.5), we find that undecidedness, (G.6), corresponds with
deciban(0.5) = 10 log10(1) = 0. (G.7)
Just as 1 db sound represents the just noticeable difference relative to silence, so a
±1 deciban change in probability represents the just noticeable difference relative
to undecidedness, [20].
60The particular U-shape of the non-informative Jeffreys’ prior for the parameter θ of the beta
distribution,
p(θ) ∝ θ−1 (1− θ)−1 ,
is a consequence of the non-linearity of probabilities. If we make a change of variable from θ to the
log-odds ω = log [θ/ (1− θ)], then it may be found that the implied non-informative prior of the
log-odds ω is uniform,
p(ω) ∝ constant.
So, log-odds, having the whole infinity of the x-axis at their disposal, are linear; whereas probabilities,
being forced to lie within the heavily constricted interval [0, 1], are not.
61Good wrote about 2000 articles on Bayesian statistics, found throughout the statistical and
philosophical literature starting in 1940. Workers in the field generally granted that every idea
in modern statistics can be found expressed by him in one or more of these articles; but their
sheer number made it impossible to find or cite them, and most are only one or two pages long,
dashed off in an hour and never developed further. So, for many years, whatever one did in
Bayesian statistics, one just conceded priority to Jack Good by default, without attempting the
literature search, which would have required days. Finally, in 1983, a bibliography was provided
of most of the first 1517 of these articles with a long index, so it is now possible to give proper
acknowledgments of his works up to 1983, [30].
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Using (G.5), we find that the decibans associated with the probabilities 0.99 and
1.00 are, respectively,
deciban(0.99) = 10 log10
0.99
0.01
= 19.96 (G.8)
and
deciban(1.00) = 10 log10
1.00
0.00
→∞. (G.9)
Now, (G.9) tells us that a probability 1.00 is a limit case of absolute certainty. And
(G.8) tells us that a probability of 0.99 is not, representing just under 20 decibans
of evidence for proposition A being true.
So, the difference in evidence for proposition A being true for the probabilities
0.99 and 1.00 is much more than 1 deciban:
deciban(1.00)− deciban(0.99) =∞ >> 1. (G.10)
In contrast, the probabilities of 0.10 and 0.11 correspond with a less than 1 deciban
difference in evidence, (G.5):
deciban(0.11)− deciban(0.10) = 0.46 < 1. (G.11)
So, if we find that subjects prefer the second bet in the second collection of bets,
(G.3) and (G.4), then this also may be interpreted as follows. Subjects are indifferent
to the difference in probabilities 0.10 and 0.11, as this difference represents a change
of less then 1 deciban in the plausibility of hypothesis A being true, (G.11). So, all
things being equal, subjects choose the bet with the highest potential payout of
5.000.000 dollars.
In closing, the deciban, (G.5), represents the intuitive scale on which the plausi-
bility of proposition A being true, relative to it not being true, is judged; that is, the
deciban is the scale of the numerically coded plausibilities, whereas the probability,
P =
10
deciban(P )
10
1 + 10
deciban(P )
10
, (G.12)
represents the non-intuitive ‘technical’ scale, which follows from the quantification
of our common sense, [41, 58].
So, if the difference between probabilities of 0.99 and 1.00 has more impact on
preferences than the difference between 0.10 and 0.11, as is found in psychological
experiments, then this is reflective of the fact that the qualitative properties of the
intuitive deciban-scale, up to a certain point, are retained in the transformation to
the more technical probability-scale.
We say up to a certain point, because probability theory, which makes use of the
technical probabilities, is common sense amplified, having a much higher probability
resolution than our human brains can ever hope to achieve. More concretely, we
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expect that for human probability perception the range of meaningful decibans is
bounded somewhere around, say, ±40 deciban, [30].
Appendix H. The Framing Effect
The assumption that preferences are not affected by variations of irrelevant
features of options or outcomes is called invariance, [62].
According to Kahneman and Tversky invariance is an essential aspect of ratio-
nality, which is violated in demonstrations of framing effects, [35]. Now, in order to
discuss these framing effects, we will first have to discuss the topic of loss and gain
adaptation62.
Imagine a business man who has lost 2000 in a business venture, and now is
facing a choice between a sure gain of 1000 and an even chance to win 2000 or
nothing, [34].
If this business man has not adapted to his loss, he is likely to add this loss to
all the outcomes and, consequently, by way of the Weber-Fechner law, code the
problem as a choice between the following utility distributions
p(u|D1) =
{
1.0, u = q log S0−1000S0 (H.1)
and
p(u|D2) =
0.5, u = q log S0−2000S00.5, u = q log S0−0S0 (H.2)
where S0 is the pre-loss asset position and q is the Weber constant for money.
Looking at the increments in assets, it is predicted that our business man will
tend to prefer D2 over D1, as this is the preferred choice under risk seeking in the
negative domain. It follows that a failure to adapt to losses may induce risk seeking
in the negative domain, [34].
Stated differently, a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to
accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise. We may find support
for this hypothesis by the observation that the tendency to bet on long shots will
increase in the course of a betting day, [47].
However, if our business man has adapted to his loss, then he will update his
pre-loss asset position S0 to an adjusted asset position S
(adj.)
0 in which the loss is
discounted:
S
(adj.)
0 = S0 − 2000
and code the problem as a choice between the utility distributions
p(u|D1) =
{
1.0, u = q log
S
(adj.)
0 + 1000
S
(adj.)
0
(H.3)
62What we will call loss and gain adaptation, is called shifts of reference by Kahneman and
Tversky in their [34].
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and
p(u|D2) =

0.5, u = q log
S
(adj.)
0 + 0
S
(adj.)
0
0.5, u = q log
S
(adj.)
0 + 2000
S
(adj.)
0
(H.4)
where S
(adj.)
0 is the post-loss asset position and q is the Weber constant for money.
Again looking at the increments in assets, we see that the signs of these increments
have reversed. By this reversal in the sign of the asset increments, we go from a risk
seeking in the negative domain scenario to a risk aversion in the positive domain
scenario, [34]. So, it is now predicted that our business man, having already adapted
to his loss, will tend to reverse his preferences, and choose D1 over D2.
Having introduced the concepts of loss and gain adaptation and the adjusted
initial wealth S
(adj.)
0 , we now may turn to the discussion of the framing effect.
Consider the following problems, which were presented to two different groups of
subjects, [34].
Group 1: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given
1000. You are now asked to choose between
p(O|D1) =
0.5, O = 00.5, O = 1000
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = 500
Group 2: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given
2000. You are now asked to choose between
p(O|D1) =
0.5, O = −10000.5, O = 0
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = −500
It is found that 84% of N = 70 subjects in Group 1 prefer bet D2 over bet D1;
whereas 69% of N = 68 subjects in Group 2 prefer bet D1 over bet D2, indicating
risk seeking in the negative domain, [34].
This result may indicate that the subjects in both groups adapted to the respective
gifts of 1000 and 2000, by adjusting their initial S0 into a new S
(adj.)
0 , before choosing
between the two bets. Since we would have expected to see the same preferences
for both groups had the gifts been discounted in the outcomes63. But instead, we
63It may be checked that a discounting of the respective gifts in the corresponding outcomes would
have resulted in identical outcome probability distributions for both Groups 1 and 2:
p(O|D1) =
{
0.5, O = 1000
0.5, O = 2000
66 H.R.N. VAN ERP, R.O. LINGER, AND P.H.A.J.M. VAN GELDER
observe a reversal in preferences. So, we conclude that the gifts must have been
discounted in initial wealth, rather than in the outcomes.
Furthermore, based on the unadjusted outcomes alone, as given in the corre-
sponding outcome probability distributions, we would expect both the observed risk
aversion in the positive domain in Group 1, that is, the observed preference of D2
over D1, and the observed risk seeking in the negative domain in Group 2, that is,
the observed preference of D1 over D2. This then also points to an adjustment of
the initial wealth, rather an adjustment of the outcomes.
However, an alternative, more parsimonious, explanation for this framing effect,
or, equivalently, the observed reversal in preferences in both groups, would be that
the respective gifts of 1000 and 2000 were neglected by the subjects. And we would
tend to agree with Kahneman and Tversky on this one, [34]. For, when reviewing
these hypothetical choices, we ourselves overlooked these gifts too.
But where Kahneman and Tversky see the framing effect as an indication that
such monetary gifts, as a rule, will not factor into our real-life decisions, we quote,
[34]:
The apparent neglect of a bonus [our gift] that was common to
both options [our decisions D1 and D2] in Problems 11 and 12 [our
Groups 1 and 2] implies that the carriers of value or utility are
changes of wealth, rather than final asset positions that include
current wealth. This conclusion is the cornerstone of an alternative
theory of risky choice [their prospect theory].
We, instead, propose that this neglect of the gifts point to the limitations of
the experimental method of hypothetical choices, as employed by Kahneman and
Tversky.
Strictly speaking for ourselves, the receiving of a real-life gift of either 1000
or 2000 euros would be quite the occasion. Consequently, we can hardly imagine
neglecting such a substantial sum of money, or, for that matter, not factoring its
occurrence in our subsequent monetary decisions64.
So, it would seem, at least based on the above [34] quotation, that Kahneman
and Tversky build their prospect theory around a phenomenon which, as our
introspection would suggest, is nothing but an experimental artifact of the method
of hypothetical choices.
and
p(O|D2) =
{
1.0, O = 1500 .
64The question if such a gift would be discounted into our initial wealth S0, or into the specific
outcomes ∆S of some set of decisions Di, would be dependent on the particular context in which
the gift was received.
